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#### Farm bill will pass—key legislators are working out food stamp differences

Politico 11/20 – “Farm bill talks intensify”, David Rogers, 11/20/13, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/11/food-stamp-costs-farm-bill-100158.html

Farm bill talks intensified Wednesday night even as a new report showed that food stamp expenditures are already beginning to fall as a share of the economy — a downward decline that’s expected to accelerate over the next five years.

Further cuts from food stamps are a major dividing point in the farm bill negotiations now, but there is growing pressure to try to reach a deal in the next few days on both the nutrition and commodity titles.

The top four members of the House and Senate Agriculture Committees met for almost 90 minutes Wednesday evening behind closed doors with staff. Further discussions are expected Thursday morning, and House Chairman Frank Lucas (R-Okla.) held out the possibility of more meetings Friday depending on what progress is being made.

“It was a good discussion. …We’re not there yet,” Lucas told reporters. “It’s complicated and we’re making progress,” echoed his Senate counterpart, Chairwoman Debbie Stabenow (D-Mich.).

Most telling, perhaps, Minnesota Rep. Collin Peterson, the ranking Democrat on the House panel and the chairman during the last farm bill, sounded a more upbeat note than he has of late. Asked if a deal were possible this week, Peterson said, “I think it is.”

Wednesday’s report, authored by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, tracks the rapid rise of food stamp costs during the recession but also points toward evidence already of a downward slope as the economy improves.

The final numbers for fiscal 2013, which ended Sept. 30, show a modest downward drop. Outlays for October — the first month of fiscal 2014 — were about 5.5 percent below those for October 2012, a year ago. And November ushered in a 7 percent benefit cut as the Agriculture Department began to roll back increases enacted in 2009 as part of President Barack Obama’s stimulus program.

As a result, outlays for 2014 are expected to fall to $78.5 billion compared to $82.5 billion in 2013. And the Center projects that by 2018, food stamp costs will be down to 0.36 percent of the economy as measured by the gross domestic product.

That would be the lowest percentage since Obama won election in 2008 amid the financial collapse. And it represents an almost one-third reduction from the high of 0.52 percent in recent years.

Nonetheless, the dramatic growth in spending for food stamps, formally titled the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, makes it a major issue in the debate over a new farm bill — the first since the recession.

House Republicans are proposing nearly $40 billion in savings over the next decade — roughly 10 times what the Democratic Senate has supported. And the slow pace of the talks is becoming a worry for the Republican leadership.

Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) had been banking on putting the farm bill debate behind him this year, with passage of a conference report before the House goes home for Christmas in mid-December.

Lucas badly wants the framework of a deal this week and is pressing the Senate to move to at least $10 billion in savings. There are several options for achieving this without dramatic harm to the program. And to win over Democrats, a portion of the savings could be reinvested in employment and training grants to states — a priority for governors of both parties.

Nonetheless, the task has gotten far harder after the rollback in benefits this month.

This cut had been long scheduled and was inevitably part of the calculus when Obama first increased benefits temporarily to boost the economy. But the timing could not be worse for the farm bill. And Stabenow has been insisting that the multiyear savings of $11 billion should be counted with the $4 billion already in her bill.

An added hindrance is the fact that Peterson has been preoccupied with an entirely separate battle with Boehner over dairy provisions in the farm bill. As a former chairman and veteran political player, the Minnesota Democrat is an ally Lucas needs to work a deal with Democrats on food stamps. And to the extent Peterson has been so focused on dairy, it appears to have slowed progress in the talks.

The Center, a progressive nonprofit based in Washington, is respected for its own expertise regarding food stamps. And apart from the new data, the economic analysis provides some context for the fight.

“Once the economy has fully recovered, SNAP costs are expected to rise only in response to growth in the size of the low-income population and increases in food prices,” the report says. “Unlike health care programs and Social Security, there are no demographic or programmatic pressures that will cause SNAP costs to grow faster than the overall economy. Thus, SNAP is not contributing to the nation’s long-term fiscal problems.”

#### PC is key – overcomes partisanship

Josh Lederman 10/18/13, reporter for the Associated Press, and Jim Kuhnhenn, “No safe bets for Obama despite toned-down agenda,” US News and World Report, http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2013/10/18/no-safe-bets-for-obama-despite-toned-down-agenda

WASHINGTON (AP) — Regrouping after a feud with Congress stalled his agenda, President Barack Obama is laying down a three-item to-do list for Congress that seems meager when compared with the bold, progressive agenda he envisioned at the start of his second term.¶ But given the capital's partisanship, the complexities of the issues and the limited time left, even those items — immigration, farm legislation and a budget — amount to ambitious goals that will take political muscle, skill and ever-elusive compromise to execute.¶ "Those are three specific things that would make a huge difference in our economy right now," Obama said. "And we could get them done by the end of the year if our focus is on what's good for the American people."

#### Economic engagement with Mexico is politically divisive despite supporters

Wilson 13 – Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars (Christopher E., January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf)

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, the choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.

#### New farm bill key to prevent a food price spike

Nelson 10/17/13 [Joe Nelson, writer for WEAU news, “Obama, ag industry waiting for new Farm bill,” <http://www.weau.com/home/headlines/Obama-ag-industry-waiting-for-new-Farm-Bill-228259521.html>]

With the government shutdown over, farmers are still waiting for a deal to be made.¶ President Obama listed the farm bill as one of his top priorities to address, which could protect farmers and low income families.¶ “We should pass a farm bill, one that American farmers and ranchers can depend on, one that protects vulnerable children and adults in times of need, one that gives rural communities opportunities to grow and the long-term certainty that they deserve. Again, the Senate's already passed a solid bipartisan bill. It's got support from democrats and republicans. It's sitting in the House waiting for passage. If House republicans have ideas that they think would improve the farm bill, let's see them. Let's negotiate. What are we waiting for? Let's get this done,” Obama said.¶ Farmers said if they struggle without a farm bill, it could cause food prices to spike, force some out of the industry and damage the economy.¶ “If the milk price falls below a certain level, the Farm bill does help support farmers during a time of an economic crisis when prices drop too low,” Chippewa County U.W. Extension Crops and Soils Educator, Jerry Clark¶ The current, five-year Farm bill was temporarily extended, but both farmers and Clark said with much to lose, a new one is needed.¶ “Any time we can get the new bill passed, it's definitely going to help because there's always new changes in agriculture, as far as commodities or practices that need to be implemented,” Clark said. “So those types of things should be passed to keep up with the current trends in agriculture.¶ Durand corn and soybean farmer and Value Implement dealer TJ Poeschel says not having a new farm bill and reverting to a bill from 1949 could cut down profits or even force some farmers to quit or retire.

#### Extinction

Brown 9 (Lester R, Founder of the Worldwatch Institute and the Earth Policy Institute “Can Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?” Scientific American, May, <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=civilization-food-shortages>)

The biggest threat to global stability is the potential for food crises in poor countries to cause government collapse. Those crises are brought on by ever worsening environmental degradation¶ One of the toughest things for people to do is to anticipate sudden change. Typically we project the future by extrapolating from trends in the past. Much of the time this approach works well. But sometimes it fails spectacularly, and people are simply blindsided by events such as today's economic crisis.¶ For most of us, the idea that civilization itself could disintegrate probably seems preposterous. Who would not find it hard to think seriously about such a complete departure from what we expect of ordinary life? What evidence could make us heed a warning so dire--and how would we go about responding to it? We are so inured to a long list of highly unlikely catastrophes that we are virtually programmed to dismiss them all with a wave of the hand: Sure, our civilization might devolve into chaos--and Earth might collide with an asteroid, too! For many years I have studied global agricultural, population, environmental and economic trends and their interactions. The combined effects of those trends and the political tensions they generate point to the breakdown of governments and societies. Yet I, too, have resisted the idea that food shortages could bring down not only individual governments but also our global civilization.¶ I can no longer ignore that risk. Our continuing failure to deal with the environmental declines that are undermining the world food economy--most important, falling water tables, eroding soils and rising temperatures--forces me to conclude that such a collapse is possible. The Problem of Failed States Even a cursory look at the vital signs of our current world order lends unwelcome support to my conclusion. And those of us in the environmental field are well into our third decade of charting trends of environmental decline without seeing any significant effort to reverse a single one. In six of the past nine years world grain production has fallen short of consumption, forcing a steady drawdown in stocks. When the 2008 harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in the bin when the new harvest begins) were at 62 days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in the spring and summer of last year climbed to the highest level ever.As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge of chaos. Unable to buy grain or grow their own, hungry people take to the streets. Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008, the number of failing states was expanding [see sidebar at left]. Many of their problem's stem from a failure to slow the growth of their populations. But if the food situation continues to deteriorate, entire nations will break down at an ever increasing rate. We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states. It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk.States fail when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security and basic social services such as education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that food relief workers are no longer safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating conditions have already put such programs in jeopardy.Failing states are of international concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons and refugees, threatening political stability everywhere. Somalia, number one on the 2008 list of failing states, has become a base for piracy. Iraq, number five, is a hotbed for terrorist training. Afghanistan, number seven, is the world's leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (number six).Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nation-states to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control international terrorism and to reach scores of other common goals. If the system for controlling infectious diseases--such as polio, SARS or avian flu--breaks down, humanity will be in trouble. Once states fail, no one assumes responsibility for their debt to outside lenders. If enough states disintegrate, their fall will threaten the stability of global civilization itself.

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#### US-Mexico trade is the prime example of neoliberalism – spills over to other countries

MSN No Date – Mexico Solidarity Network; “Mexico - A neoliberal experiment”; <http://www.mexicosolidarity.org/programs/alternativeeconomy/neoliberalism>

The United States and Mexico have been central to the development of the neoliberal model. We share a 2,000 mile border, the only place in the world where the Global North meets the South. The US-Mexico border is unique, and the relationship between the two nations is equally unique.

In many ways, this geographic marriage represents the most important relationship in the world - a laboratory that is defining the neoliberal model. Three historical markers stand out as central to the development of neoliberalism: the establishment of free trade zones and maquiladoras in 1965, Structural Adjustment Programs initiated by the International Monetary Fund in 1982, and the signing of the North America Free Trade Agreement in 1994.

The US-Mexico relationship has been the proving ground for the practical realities of the Washington consensus: production-for-export replacing production for internal consumption, the use of debt as a lever to force structural adjustment programs, loose investment rules that allow hot money to cross borders in seconds, and a trade agreement (read NAFTA) that is the model for a new legal framework that expands the rights of corporations at the expense of civil society.

Experiments that "work," from the perspective of transnational capital (and all of the above-mentioned experiments "worked") are exported to other countries. This implies a complete restructuring of the economies, politics and cultures around the world, to make them consistent with the neoliberal vision. Nearly everything is on the table for reform: economic policy, public subsidies, social programs, industrial policy, government procurement, intellectual property rights, patents, banking and financial services, agricultural policy, foreign direct investment, energy policy, labor regulations, environmental protection, public education and health care - and the list goes on. Twenty-first century neoliberalism is a project for world domination, and the US and Mexico are at the center of the vortex.

#### The alternative is to vote negative to endorse a radical break from neoliberal market society. Piecemeal reforms like the permutation reinforce the incalculable everyday violence of market fundamentalism. Every impact is symptomatic of the neoliberal authoritarian impulse that necessarily results in global omnicide.

Giroux 9/25/13

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What kind of society emerges when it is governed by **the market-driven assumption** that the only value that matters is exchange value, when the common good is denigrated to the status of a mall, and the social order is composed only of individuals free to pursue their own interests? What happens to democracy when a government inflicts on the American public narrow market-driven values, corporate relations of power and policies that impose gross inequities on society, and condemns young people to a life of precarity in which the future begins to resemble a remake of dystopian films such as Mad Max (1979), Brazil (1985), RoboCop (1987), Minority Report (2002), District Nine (2009), Comopolis (2012) and The Purge (2013). What makes American society distinct in the present historical moment is a culture and social order that has not only lost its moral bearings but produces a level of symbolic and real violence whose visibility and existence set a new standard for cruelty, humiliation and the **mechanizations of a mad war machine,** all of which serve the interests of the political and corporate **walking dead -** the new avatars of death and cruelty - **that plunder the social order**.[i] Unfortunately, the dark and dire images of America’s dysimagination machine made visible endlessly in all the mainstream cultural apparatuses have been exceeded by a society rooted in a savage politics in which extreme forms of violencehave become both spectacle and modus operandi of how American society governs and entertains itself. Evidence of the decay of American democracy is not only found in the fact that the government is now controlled by a handful of powerful right-wing and corporate interests, it is also increasingly made manifest in the daily acts of cruelty and violence that shroud that American landscape like a vast and fast-moving dust storm. Unspeakable violence, extending from the murder of young people and children at Columbine High School, Virginia Tech University and Sandy Hook Elementary School, to name a few, to the recent mass shootings at Fort Hood, Texas, and the Washington Navy Yard give credence to the notion that violence now **becomes the most important** **element of power and mediating force** in shaping social relationships. Mass violence has become so routine that it no longer evokes visceral responses from the public. For instance, when such violence engulfs major cities such as Chicago, the public barely blinks. And as the mass shootings increase, they will barely be covered by mainstream media, who have no critical language by which to engage such events except as aberrations with no systemic causes. The line between the spectacle of violence and the reality of everyday violence has become blurred, making it difficult to respond to and understand the origins of symbolic and institutional violence in the economic, political and social formations that now rule American society. Violence has become so normalized that **it no longer has a history**. That is, its political and economic structures have become invisible, and the painful memories it evokes disappear quickly among the barrage of spectacles of violence and advertisements addressing us not as moral beings but as customers seeking new commodities, instant pleasure and ever-shocking thrills. At the same time, violence in America is fed by a culture of fear - shaped, in part, by a preoccupation with surveillance, incarceration and **the personal security industry.** And, as a result, American society has made “a sinister turn towards intense social control,”[ii] and a “political culture of hyper punitiveness.” [iii] The tentacles of this high-intensity violence, now normalized, reach into **every** aspect of society - a spectacle that does not unsettle but **thrives** on more shocks, more bloodshed and more suffering. The political, corporate and intellectual zombies that rule America love death-dealing institutions, which accounts for why they rarely criticize the bloated military budget and the rise of the incarceration and punishing state. They embrace the demands of an empire that kills innocent people with automated drones and sanctions torture and are all too willing to raise their voices to fever pitch to promote war as the only viable tool of diplomacy. Witness the almost-hysterical displays of public anger by Sens. John McCain and Lindsay Graham over President Barack Obama’s decision to avert bombing Syria in favor of a diplomatic solution. State violence is now the sanctioned norm of rule in a society in which political fanatics, such as Ted Cruz, Paul Ryan and Sen. Marco Rubio define policy according to a friend/enemy distinction and in doing so **transform politics into** an extension of **war**. Unrelenting in their role as archetypes of the hyper-dead, the Tea Party fanatics and their gutless allies spectacularize hatred and trade in fear, lies and misinformation while trying to hold the American public and the government hostage to their fanatical market-driven principles. We are witnessing the militarization of all aspects of American politics and life, and one consequence is a **growing authoritarianism** in which democracy becomes **its ultimate victim.** No sphere is immune from this madness. For instance, Ohio State University, as a result of a gift from military surplus, has added an armored military vehicle to its campus security forces - all the better to inculcate not only the values of militarization in young students but also a culture of fear, violence, thoughtlessness and insecurity.[iv] Local police forces now resemble SWAT teams and make clear that force is the most important way to address not just criminal behavior but also social problems.[v] Images of the police do not simply saturate television dramas, they have become the most visible humans occupying public schools. Needless to say, violence is not just visible in the spectacle of entertainment or in the visibility of **deep-rooted economic inequalities** arrogantly defended by the rich; it is also discernible in the everyday actions and small change of daily interactions as the punishing state injects the ideology of violence into legislation designed to cripple and impose pain upon large segments of the population regarded as disposable, excess and unworthy of social supports. For instance, the cutting of $40 billion from the food stamp program (SNAP) by the mostly wealthy, white, right-wing extremists that make up the Republican Party members of the House of Representatives exemplifies the new face of a savage politics. In responding to the cuts, Timothy Egan, an opinion writer for The New York Times, stresses rightly the cruelty implicit in this piece of legislation and what it says about the extremists driving the Republican Party. He writes: The Republican-dominated House passed a bill that would deprive 3.8 million people of assistance to buy food next year. ... A Republican majority that refuses to govern on other issues found the votes to shove nearly 4 million people back into poverty, joining 46.5 million at a desperation line that has failed to improve since the dawn of the Great Recession. It’s a heartless bill, aimed to hurt. Republicans don’t see it that way, of course. They think too many of their fellow citizens are cheats and loafers, dining out on lobster.[vi] What Egan fails to point out is that “an estimated 210,000 children will lose access to free school lunch programs and 55,000 jobs will be lost in the first year of cuts alone.”[vii] He also fails to mention that the war being waged on food stamps by the Republican Party is symptomatic of a larger war waged against the poor. Being poor in America means that one has no moral stature and is subject to a variety of state intrusions, such as drug testing, that assume that the poor are criminals. **Being poor has become a crime,** and when coupled with the now-commonplace racially inflected language of "us vs. them" so prominent among right-wing politicians, the ugly poison of bigotry and racism once again is on full display as part of an effort to promote Jim Crow legislation, revealing the white supremacist ideology that characterizes the extremists leading the Republican Party. The new extremists are not simply political loons out of touch with America, as some critics describe them. They are the face of the emerging counter-revolution taking over the nation - an updated and kinder **version of the** fascist **brownshirts now dressed in suits carrying black briefcases and living in guarded communities**. They are the dark angels of violence, and they trade in the mass psychology of fear and hate. They despise compromise and live by a take-no-prisoners political sensibility. They want to eliminate any vestiges of the government that provide social protections. As I mentioned previously, they also want to shut down the government and strip the American public of health care benefits while consolidating power in the hands of a party that, as former President Jimmy Carter pointed out, removed America from the pretense of being a functioning democracy.[viii] But they are not alone. Behind Obama’s facile smile and Ivy League civility lies a not-so-hidden form of authoritarian politics and a mode of ethical barbarism that allows him to believe he has the right to kill people without any recourse to due process, destroy civil liberties and implement the policies of Wall Street gangsters. Whistleblowers such as Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning who are repulsed by the moral and political abuses of government and have courageously spoken out against such practices are labeled as traitors by the dominant media and many of the politicians bought off by the lobbyists who have made the Congress and White House their second home.[ix] Similarly, the same administration that refused to prosecute those government officials who tortured, maimed, imprisoned and abducted thousands of innocent human beings now condemn those whistleblowers such as Manning, Snowden, and Aaron Swartz, who exposed the political conditions that created them in the first place. The increasing militarization of American society is matched by its **increasing depoliticization and its increasing incapacity to make moral judgments and act** with compassion **against** the most shocking **injustices**. George Lakoff and Elisabeth Wehling are right in arguing that conservatives view the public as immoral and can imagine democracy only as “providing the maximal liberty to seek one’s self interest without being responsible for the interest of others. ... Lack of success implies lack of discipline and character, which means you deserve your poverty.”[x] Moral responsibility is now in full flight condemned to a bygone era when the social contract actually had some meaning. A moral coma has engulfed the United States, as individuals can no longer connect private troubles to broader social and systemic issues. The art of translation, which is crucial to any viable democracy, dissolves into the septic tank of celebrity culture and the dead zone of a market society exemplified in the growing infantilization of a citizenry shaped by the rapid proliferation of a culture of idiocy, civic illiteracy and authoritarianism. Casino capitalism and its right-wing apostles lack any sense of ethics or respect for the social contract and spew feverishly an endless rhetoric of hate and vile over the airwaves. The **unapologetic discourse of racism,** **humiliation and cruelty has become an industry** for the likes of Rush Limbaugh, Michael Savage, Michelle Malkin and politicians of the same ilk who relentlessly describe immigrants as vermin, denounce young student protesters as un-American, argue that women are undeserving of any control over their reproductive rights, resurrect the legacy of Jim Crow by denying poor minorities their voting rights, and take pride in shaming those on welfare as lazy and undeserving of social benefits. For instance, “Georgia state Rep. Terry England compared women to farm animals while discussing an abortion measure on the Georgia state house floor.”[xi] But there is more at stake here than the poisonous rhetoric of racism and class warfare. There is also the rise of a punishing state, which now has the highest incarceration rate in the world, with more than 700 people per 100,000 in prison. This is a punishing machine whose mad violence elevates a hyper-punitiveness over any sense of compassion or respect for the other, especially those who are in need of decent health care, social services and the most basic right to a decent job and life of dignity.[xii] Mass shootings have become the new index of violence in America, but they pale in terms of human destruction and mass suffering with the infliction of hardship and misery imposed on millions of people daily in the United States **under the regime of casino capitalism.** Evidence for the death of the American dream is everywhere: Millions of people have lost their homes, and young people are living with the nightmare of a future without jobs, hopes and security, if not dignity. At the same time, many soldiers returning from the senseless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and suffering from a wide range of illnesses are given shoddy and sometime death-dealing treatment by the veterans’ hospitals. In some cases, they are turned into drug addicts because the hospitals, in their efforts to keep them quiet rather than give them proper treatment, overprescribe painkillers. Unfortunately, such neglect does more than keep them quiet; it often results in their needless deaths. Poor children are denied proper health care and school lunches. The poverty rate in America grows to unimaginable numbers matched only by the increasing growth in income and wealth by the super-rich. The corporate educational reform movement teaches young people how to be stupid and dissolves all vestiges of creativity in the mad frenzy of an audit culture. At the same time, students find themselves in a job market that offers them little but dashed dreams and low-skill jobs, if they are lucky enough to find one. The small change of human cruelty and a savage politics was evident recently in newspaper accounts about the rise of expensive condos in the Upper West Side of Manhattan that have one entrance for the rich and another for “working people who won a city lottery to obtain affordable apartments in the building.”[xiii] There is a larger politics at work here than the obvious class and racist implications. Connect the dots of this particularly racist and class-based policy to the rapidly proliferating decisions on the part of Tea Party politicians to produce policies that force the frail, poor and aged to choose between medicine and food. Or the decision on the part of the state of Nevada to dump “1,500 mental patients onto other states by putting them on Greyhound busses and sen[ding] them over state lines with no prior arrangements with families or other mental hospitals once they arrive.”[xiv] **This is a new kind of authoritarianism** that does not speak in the jingoistic discourse of empowerment, exceptionalism or nationalism. Instead, it defines itself in the language of cruelty, suffering and fear, and it does so with a sneer and an unbridled disdain for those considered disposable. **Neoliberal society mimics the search for purity we have seen in other totalitarian societies.** Right-wing market fundamentalists want to root out those considered defective consumers and citizens, along with allegedly unpatriotic dissidents. They also want to punish the poor and remove their children from the possibility of a quality public education. Hence, they develop schools that are dead zones of the imagination for most children and highly creative classroom environments free of the frenzy of empiricism and test-taking for the children of the rich. It gets worse. In Pennsylvania, right-wing Gov. Tom Corbett and Philadelphia Mayor Michael Nutter are intent on destroying the public school system. Instead of funding public schools, Corbett and Nutter are intent on crushing the teachers union and supporting vouchers and charter schools. They also are fond of claiming that money can’t help struggling public schools as a pretext for closing more than 23 schools “while building a $400 million state prison.”[xv] As Aaron Kase reports, “Things have gotten so bad that at least one school has asked parents to chip in $613 per student just so they can open with adequate services, which, if it becomes the norm, effectively defeats the purpose of equitable public education, and is entirely unreasonable to expect from the city’s poorer neighborhoods.”[xvi] Vouchers and under-regulated charter schools have become the unapologetic face of a vicious form of casino capitalism waging war on the imagination while imposing a range of harsh and punitive disciplinary methods on teachers and students, particularly low-income and poor white minorities.[xvii] The vast stores of knowledge and human creativity needed by young people to face a range of social, economic and political problems in the future are not simply being deferred, they are **being systematically destroyed.** When the emancipatory potential of education does emerge, it is often couched in the deadening discourse of establishing comfort zones in classrooms as a way of eliminating any pedagogy that provokes, unsettles or educates students to think critically. Critical knowledge and pedagogy are now judged as viable only to the degree that they do not make a student uncomfortable. There is more at stake here than the death of the imagination; there is also the elimination of those modes of **agency that make a democracy possible**. In the face of such cruel injustices, neoliberalism remains mute, disdaining democratic politics by claiming there are no alternatives to casino capitalism. Power in the United States has been uprooted from any respect for public value, the common good and democratic politics. This is not only visible in the fact that 1 percent of the population now owns 40 percent of the nation’s wealth or took home “more than half of the nation’s income,” it is also evident in a culture that normalizes, legitimates and thrives in a politics of humiliation, cruelty, racism and class discrimination.[xviii] Political, moral and economic foundations float free of constraints. Moral and social responsibilities are unmoored, free from any sense of responsibility or accountability in a permanent war state. Repression is now the dominant mantra for all of society. As Zygmunt Bauman and David Lyons point out, the American public has been turned into “security addicts,” ingesting mistrust, suspicion and fear as the new common sense for a security state that seems intent on causing the death of everything that matters in a democracy.[xix] The surveillance state works hard to not only monitor our phone conversations or track our Internet communication but to turn us into consumers, ratchet up the desire to be watched, and enforce new registers of social exclusion between those inside and outside the official temples of consumerism, social rights and captainship itself. Confining, excluding and vigilantism is one register of the new face of authoritarianism in the US. As America enters a historical era dominated by an authoritarian repressive state, the refugee camp as a symbol of exclusion and suffering is everywhere, visible in the material encampments for the homeless, urban ghettoes, jails, detention centers for young people, and in the tents propping up alongside highways that hold the new refugees from the suburbs who have lost their jobs, homes and dignity. The refugee camp also has become a metaphor for those who question authority, because they are increasingly rendered stateless, useless and undesirable. Critical thought is now considered dangerous, discomforting and subject to government prosecution, as is evident in the war being waged against whistleblowers in the name of national (in)security.[xx] The technologies of smart missiles hunt down those considered enemies of the United States, removing the ethical imagination from the horror of the violence it inflicts while solidifying the “victory of technology over ethics.”[xxi] Sorting out populations based on wealth, race, the ability to consume and immigration status is the new face of America. The **pathologies of inequality have come home to roost in America**.[xxii] Moreover, as suffering increases among vast swaths of the population, the corporate elite and rich use the proliferating crises to extract more wealth, profits and resources.[xxiii] Crises become the new rationale for destroying the ideologies, values and institutions that give power to the social contract. [xxiv] The ethos of rabid individualism, hyper-masculinity and a survival-of-the-fittest ethic **has created a society of throwaways** of both goods and people. The savage ethic of economic Darwinism also drives the stories we now tell about ourselves. The state of collective unconsciousness that haunts America has its deepest roots not only in the writings of Friedrich Hyek, Ayn Rand, Milton Friedman and other neoliberal philosophers but also in the increasing merging power of private-sector corporations that, as John Ralston Saul has argued, has its roots in the “anti-democratic underpinnings of Fascist Italy in particular, but also of Nazi Germany.”[xxv] Today this “corporatism [is] so strong it that it has taken the guts out of much of daily democratic life.”[xxvi] Combined with the power of the national surveillance state, it is fair to say, again quoting Saul, that “corporatism, with all of the problems attached to it, is digging itself ever deeper into our society, undermining our society.”[xxvii] Clearly, those words echoed a few years ago were not only prescient but vastly underestimated the growing authoritarianism in the United States, in particular. We now live in a society in which leadership has been usurped by models of **corporate management**, self-interest has triumphed over the ethical imagination, and a respect for others is discarded for the crude instrumental goal of accumulating capital, regardless of the social costs. Intellectuals in too many public spheres have become either dysfunctional or they have sold out. Higher education is no longer the city on the hill. Instead it has become a corporate boardroom/factory in which Bill Gates wannabes govern the university as if it were an outpost of Wall Street. Outside of the boardrooms, intellectual violence prevails aimed largely at faculty and students, who are reduced to either grant writers or consumers. To make matters worse academic knowledge is drowning in firewalls of obtuseness, creating a world of dysfunctional intellectuals, at least those who have tenure. Those who don’t have such security are tied to the harsh rhythm and rituals of contingent subaltern labor and barely make enough money to be able to pay their rent or mounting debts - never mind engage in teaching critically and creatively while writing as a sustained act of dissent. At the same time, the wider culture is sinking under a flood of consumer and celebrity idiocy. There are some who suggest that such critiques of the growing authoritarianism and repression in American society are useless and in the long run do nothing more than reinforce a crippling dystopianism. I think this line of argument is not only wrong but **complicitous** with the very problems it refuses to acknowledge. From a left suffocating in cynicism, there is the argument that people are already aware of these problems, as if neoliberal hegemony does not exist and that its success in building a consensus around its ideology as a mode of common sense is passé. At the same time, liberals detest such criticism because it calls into question the totality of American politics rather than focus on **one issue** and gestures toward a radical restructuring of American society rather than **piecemeal** and useless **reforms**. The call for such a restructuring rather than piecemeal reforms sends liberals into fits of hysteria. Of course, the right in all of its varieties views criticism as a virus that destroys everything they admire about America - a society in which democracy has been eviscerated and largely benefits the top ten percent of the population. Most importantly, the banality of evil lies less in the humdrum cruelty of everyday relations but in its normalization, the depolicitizaton of culture, and, at the present moment, in the reproduction of a neoliberal society that eradicates any vestige of public values, the ethical imagination, social responsibility, civic education and democratic social relations. The enemy is not a market economy but a market society and the breakdown of all forms of social solidarity that inform democratic politics and the cultural, political and economic institutions that make it possible. The authoritarianism that now shapes American society is not a matter of fate but one rooted in organized struggle and a vision built on the recognition that there are always alternatives to the existing order that speak to the promise of a **democracy to come**. The contradictions of neoliberalism are unraveling, but the consensus that informs it is alive and well. And it is at that level of educational intervention that the war against market authoritarianism in all of its diverse forms has to be fought first. Commonsense has become the enemy of critical thought. Hope is no longer part of the discourse of the left, only a dreary sense of despair with no vision of how to imagine a radical democracy. Manufactured ignorance has become a virtue instead of a liability in a society ruled by the financial elite. And as such we have no serious crisis of ideas. Instead, we have a crisis of power relations and structures that needs a new political language if it is to be contested at the level of both a pedagogical and political struggle. The current neoliberal drive to ruthlessly extend the never-ending task of accumulating capital is matched only by its ruthless determination to produce a notion of common sense that reinforces the idea that **there is no way to think beyond the present system**. The American public needs to break the authoritarian dysimagination machine that affirms everyone as a consumer and reduces freedom to unchecked self-interest while reproducing subjects who are willingly complicit with the plundering of the environment, resources and public goods by the financial elite. Class and racial warfare are alive and well in the United States. In fact, racism and the class warfare waged by right-wing politicians, bankers, hedge fund managers and the corporate rich are intensifying. Americans need to reject a politics in which public goods are demonized and eradicated, African-American youths become the fodder for wars abroad and the military-prison-industrial complex, the underclass disappears, public servants are disparaged, youths vanish into debt and despair, and the middle class passes into oblivion. While politics must be connected to its material moorings, it is not enough to imagine a different future than the one that now hangs over us like a suffocating sandstorm. Those intellectuals, workers, young people, artists and others committed to a radical democracy need to develop a new vocabulary about how to think about the meaning of politics, human agency and the building of a formative culture through which organized collective struggles can develop in the effort to imagine a new and more democratic future.

## solvency

#### Status quo solves – FATCA

Jolly ‘13

(David, April 19, 2013, “G-20 Pushes for Measures to End Tax Evasion” <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/20/business/global/g-20-pushes-for-measures-to-end-tax-evasion.html?_r=0>)

 The automatic exchange of tax data, an approach the United States has pushed, would represent a major change from the current procedures, in which countries are expected to provide such information only on request — as when tax officials seek to track payments across national borders during an audit.¶ Under an automatic exchange, governments would routinely transfer all foreign taxpayers’ data to their home governments, making it far more difficult to hide assets from the tax collector.¶ The impetus for the new approach is an American law, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, called Fatca, requiring Americans with overseas accounts and non-American financial firms to meet tough financial disclosure requirements. In practice, Fatca conflicts with privacy laws in many countries, so Washington has been working out bilateral deals in which overseas financial institutions share that data first with their own governments for transmission to the Internal Revenue Service in Washington.¶ European governments, initially skeptical about the idea, have become more enthusiastic amid recent public outrage over the secret offshore finance records unearthed by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. In France, the government of President François Hollande has championed the more aggressive hunt for tax dodgers since it was rocked by the disclosure that the recently ousted budget minister, Jérôme Cahuzac, was squirreling money away in a Swiss account.¶ “Fatca has been a game changer,” Pascal Saint-Amans, director of the Center for Tax Policy at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, said Friday.¶ Mr. Saint-Amans noted that in the last week, Luxembourg, long one of Europe’s most opaque financial centers, had agreed to begin automatically sharing data in the face of pressure from its European Union partners and the United States.¶ The challenge, Mr. Saint-Amans said, is to make sure the right information technology is in place to allow for secure account data transfer on a global scale. That is something the O.E.C.D. is now working on, he said.¶ The G-20 issued its statement Friday after the O.E.C.D. earlier in the day said in a progress report that Switzerland — which is not a G-20 member — was still struggling to get off a so-called blacklist of nations cited for a lack of cooperation on tax data.¶ An additional 13 jurisdictions that are not in the G-20 — including Guatemala, Lebanon, Liberia and Panama — have not made the necessary legal and regulatory changes to be removed from the list, according to the O.E.C.D. report.¶ Other excluded nations include Botswana, Brunei, Dominica, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu.¶ The O.E.C.D.’s Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes is now moving toward the adoption of a rating system, under which it would grade nations’ compliance with transparency agreements, and it expects to begin in November.¶ The United States’ push for access to overseas account data began after UBS, the biggest Swiss bank, was found several years ago to have been encouraging Americans to hide assets abroad. UBS in 2009 paid $780 million and turned over details about thousands of client accounts to defer United States prosecution.¶ While Switzerland has met most of the requirements for being removed from the O.E.C.D. blacklist, its status, the report noted, “is still subject to conditions.” Recent media reports have said a deal to open American clients’ Swiss banking data to the I.R.S. may be near.¶ Mario Tuor, a spokesman in Bern for the Swiss Federal Finance Ministry, said on Friday that the Swiss government was working to meet the O.E.C.D.’s conditions, and he said that it was unfair to lump Switzerland with truly uncooperative nations. Mr. Tuor said he could not comment about the negotiations with Washington.¶ Since 2009, the Swiss have taken a number of steps to accommodate American demands, including agreeing to more information sharing, but banks have shown dogged determination to maintain their privacy law, which makes it a crime to divulge some client information.¶ The United States continues to apply pressure. Last year, American prosecutors won indictments of Wegelin & Company, Switzerland’s oldest bank, effectively putting it out of business.

#### Aff doesn’t solve – Mexican laws create a legal barrier to implementation

Perez 12 (Katrina, analyst for Price Waterhouse Cooper Mexico, a financial services firm, The road to FATCA implementation in Mexico, 24 August 2012, http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3079950/The-road-to-FATCA-implementation-in-Mexico.html)

After the enactment of FATCA, Mexico, being supportive of the underlying goal of FATCA – combating international tax evasion by intensifying bilateral cooperation – continued its dialogue with the US Treasury and the IRS.¶ However, as in other countries, the FATCA model of automatic exchange of information raised a number of concerns and issues in Mexico, since FFIs established in Mexico are not able to comply with reporting, account closure and withholding obligations because of domestic legal constraints.¶ Controversial issues and concerns raised by the Mexican financial sector¶ TheAsociación de Bancos de México (ABM) andtheAsociación Mexicana de Intermediarios Bursátiles (AMIB) formally raised issues which would arise from FATCA implementation through two comment letters addressed to the US Treasury and IRS. The central issue raised was the existing conflict of law with respect to the application of FATCA.¶ Comment letter by the ABM and AMIB¶ In general terms, both ABM and AMIB support the FATCA initiative and its underlying objective of promoting fiscal transparency and tax compliance.¶ Both associations expressed their willingness to work with the US Treasury and IRS to develop the rules for implementation of FATCA in Mexico.¶ These associations further recognised that the proposed regulations represent a significant progress in this regard, even though many important issues remain unsolved.¶ Withholding¶ Mexican law does not allow a financial institution to withhold on payments made to recalcitrant account holders as required under FATCA. The withholding of an account holder’s funds that has not been authorised is subject to civil and criminal penalties, including up to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the responsible official in certain cases.¶ Financial secrecy rights¶ Under Mexican law it is not clear whether a waiver of financial secrecy rights would be effective.¶ Closure of accounts¶ Certain types of accounts, such as equity interests in investment funds, cannot be closed legally without the account holder’s authorisation. Mexican financial intermediaries violating Mexican law, as interpreted by their regulators, could lose their licences.¶ Cross border payments not related to financial assets and remittances¶ Concern was expressed with regard to cross border payments derived from commercial activity as the view is that such payments should not be within FATCA’s scope because they are not related to the financial sector; such payments between Mexico and the US average approximately $1 billion per day.¶ ABM and AMIB requested clarification with regard to the treatment under FATCA of these payments, so called remittances, which annually represent around $21 billion normally paid from the US to Mexico in small sums by Mexican citizens working in the US to support their families in Mexico, in the form of wire transfers and money orders.¶ ABM and AMIB considered that even though remittances do not constitute withholdable payments, this should be confirmed through an exemption applicable to certain minimaltransfers of funds via wire transfers and money orders.¶ The comment letter addressed other issues such as those related to financial entities called Retirement Funds Administrators (AFORES) in relation to the rules concerning excepted entities which pose a low risk of tax evasion, which are the primary vehicles that hold retirement funds in Mexico.¶ The letter further addressed: difficulties in consolidating treatment of FFIS on a worldwide basis; uncertainty created by the rule to determine if an entity is primarily engaged in securities trading; treatment of revolver line of credits as pre-existing accounts; definition of material modification under the rules applicable to grandfathered obligations and certain debt obligations; Mexican investment trusts as non-financial entities (NFFIs); and treatment of passthru payments.¶ On May 2012, the ABM and AMIB issued an additional comment letter to the Treasury and the IRS which provides their views regarding the proposed FATCA regulations, that complements their previous letter in regard to four items: conflict of laws, FATCA administration with regard to Mexican trusts, timeline for implementation, and compliance statements (needed for a clear FFI agreement).¶ ABM and AMIB raise the need to address the conflict of laws that represent serious constraints to implement FATCA. AMB and AMIB further propose a centralised compliance system to make the FATCA reporting regime more efficient for trusts. Also, the associations contend that the timeline is too aggressive and therefore propose relaxing the timeline. Finally, the letter addresses some concerns in relation to certifications made by the responsible officer of a participating FFI, given the complexity of US tax laws and detailed FATCA regulations and point out the need for a clear FFI agreement in this regard.¶ Comment letter by the Mexican Association of Insurance Institutions (AMIS)¶ The Mexican Association of Insurance Institutions (AMIS) provided comments on behalf of the insurance sector on June 28 2011 to the IRS and Treasury.¶ The issues expressed by AMIS were concerns about the classification of insurance companies as FFIs, application of FATCA to previous insurance plans, problems concerning identification of certain accounts, questions regarding reporting of persons participating in the insurance plans, and questions regarding amounts to be reported.

## contention one

#### No impact to econ decline

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

#### Their advantage is an construction of imperialism used to legitimize colonization under the mantle of economic liberalism

Lipschutz ‘95

Professor of Politics at UC Santa Cruz, On Security, pg 15-17)

Consider, then, the consequences of the intersection of security policy and economics during and after the Cold War. In order to establish a “secure” global system, the United States advocated, and put into place, a global system of economic liberalism. It then underwrote, with dollars and other aid, the growth of this system.43 One consequence, of this project was the globalizations of a particular mode of production and accumulation, which relied on the re-creation, throughout the world, of the domestic political and economic environment and preferences of the United States. That such a project cannot be accomplished under conditions of really-existing capitalism is not important: the idea was that economic and political liberalism would reproduce the American self around the world.44 This would make the world safe and secure for the Untited States inasmuch as it would all be the self, so to speak. The joker in this particular deck was that efforts to reproduce some version of American society abroad, in order to make the world more secure for Americans, came to threaten the cultures and societies of the countries being transformed, making their citizens less secure. The process thereby transformed them into the very enemies we feared so greatly. In Iran, for example, the Shah’s efforts to create a Westernized society engendered so much domestic resistance that not only did it bring down his empire but so, for a time, seemed to pose a mortal threat to the American Empire based on Persian Gulf oil. Islamic “fundamentalism,” now characterized by some as the enemy that will replace Communism, seems to be U.S. policymakers’ worst nightmares made real,45 although without the United States to interfere in the Middle East and elsewhere, the Islamic movements might never have acquired the domestic power they now have in those countries and regions that seem so essential to American “security.” The ways in which the framing of threats is influenced by a changing global economy is seen nowhere more clearly than in recent debates over competitiveness and “economic security.” What does it mean to be competitive? Is a national industrial policy consistent with global economic liberalization? How is the security component of this issue socially constructed? Beverly Crawford (Chapter 6: “Hawks, Doves, but no Owls: The New Security Dilemma Under International Economic Interdependence”) shows how strategic economic interdependence – a consequence of the growing liberalization of the global economic system, the increasing availability of advanced technologies through commercial markets, and the ever-increasing velocity of the product cycle – undermines the ability of states to control those technologies that, it is often argued, are critical to economic strength and military might. Not only can others acquire these technologies, they might also seek to restrict access to them. Both contingencies could be threatening. (Note, however, that by and large the only such restrictions that *have* been imposed in recent years have all come at the behest of the United States, which is most fearful of its supposed vulnerability in this respect.) What, then, is the solution to this “new security dilemma,” as Crawford has stylzed it? How can a state generate the conditions for legitimizing various forms of intervention into this process? Clearly, it is not enough to invoke the mantra of “competitiveness”; competition *with* someone is also critical. In Europe, notwithstanding budgetary stringencies, state sponsorship of cutting-edge technological R&D retains a certain, albeit declining, legitimacy in the United States, absent a persuasive threat, this is much less the case (although the discourse of the Clinton Administration suggests that such ideological restraints could be broken). Thus, it is the hyperrealism of Clyde Prestowitz, Karel Van Wolferen, and Michael Crichton, imagining a Japan resurgent and bent anew on (non) Pacific conquest, that provides the cultural materials for new economic policies. Can new industrialized enemies be conjured into existence so as to justify new cold wars and the remobilization of capital, under state direction, that must follow? Or has the world changed too much for this to happen again?

#### They don’t solve poverty—first piece of PRR newswire evidence has no qualifications and does not make a warrant—it says illicit financial flows are causing problems for elites, and says knowing that is key to “understanding global poverty”, which does not meet the level necessary for a solvency threshold

#### No China econ impact – new leadership

Li 13 – (2013, Eric, founder and managing director of Chengwei Capital, on the Board of Directors of China Europe International Business School, political scientist in Shanghai, “The Life of the Party: The Post-Democratic Future Begins in China,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138476/eric-x-li/the-life-of-the-party)

China's new leaders will govern the country for the next ten years, during which they will rely on the **CCP's adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy** to tackle major challenges. The current economic slowdown is worrying, but it is largely cyclical, not structural. Two forces will reinvigorate the economy for **at least another generation**: **urbanization and entrepreneurship**. In 1990, only about 25 percent of Chinese lived in cities. Today, 51 percent do. Before 2040, a full 75 percent -- nearly one billion people -- are expected to be urban. The amount of new roads, housing, utilities, and communications infrastructure needed to accommodate this expansion is astounding. Therefore, any apparent infrastructure or housing bubbles will be momentary. In fact, China's new leadership will need to continue or even increase investment in these sectors in the years to come. That investment and the vast new urban work force, with all its production and consumption, **will drive high economic growth rates.** The party's extraordinary ability to develop and execute policy and its political authority will help it manage these processes.

Meanwhile, entrepreneurship will help China overcome threats to its export-fueled economic model. Externally, the global economic downturn and a rising currency value have dampened Chinese trade. Internally, labor costs have risen in the country's coastal manufacturing regions. But **the market will sort out** these **problems**. After all, China's economic miracle was not just a centrally planned phenomenon. Beijing facilitated the development of a powerful market economy, but private entrepreneurs are the lifeblood of the system. And these entrepreneurs are highly adaptive. Already, some low-end manufacturing has moved inland to contain labor costs. This is coinciding with local governments' aggressive infrastructure investments and innovative efforts to attract new business. In the costal regions, many companies are producing increasingly-higher-value goods.

**Fears of China are based in deep-rooted fears of economics—this makes their impacts more likely—empirically proven**

Lim ’11

(Kean Fan, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, “What You See Is (Not) What You Get? The Taiwan Question, Geo-economic Realities, and the “China Threat” Imaginary,” Antipode Journal, Wiley Online Library, AM)

The identification of national-level threats is never straightforward; **it is often effected on emotional rather than evidential grounds**. Within the US, “Japan bashing” emerged during the 1980s vis-`a-vis domestic fears of the **waning economic competitiveness** of the US and its seeming inability to confront a “flexible” postFordist future. More recently, the US decision in 2003 to attack Iraq on the premise that it possessed weapons of mass destruction proved ultimately groundless: no such weapons were found, while Iraq slipped into anarchy and arguably became a hotbed of terrorist activities **only since** (see Fallows 2006; Gregory 2004; ´O Tuathail 2004). Mandel (2008:40) thus rightly cautions how “[t]he political manipulation of enemy images by both government officials and members of the mass public clouds over the stark realities surrounding any international enemy predicament. Together, these patterns create both ambiguity and confusion in dealing with the enemy component of global threat”. In the context of this paper, the critical question is whether a “China threat” imaginary is actually produced by forces beyond China; whether what you see is indeed what you get. Even though the US formally recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a state in 1979, the recognition was arguably conditioned by latent suspicions. As Feldman (2007:np) puts it, the Reagan administration continued to “put little trust in Chinese promises to adhere to a peaceful solution” regarding Taiwan even as it prepared to sign the 1982 communiqu´e2 with China. This “little trust”, Feldman (2007) adds, explains why Reagan gave Taiwan “Six Assurances” and also inserted a secret memo in the National Security Files noting that Taiwan’s defensive capabilities must be maintained at a level relative to China’s. **Reagan’s legacy of “little trust” seems to have permeated subsequent policy considerations**. In 1999, the Pentagon presented several scenarios in its “Asia 2025” study that portrayed China as the most significant threat to American interests in the Asia-Pacific by 2025. A decade on, the US Defense Secretary Robert Gates offers this analysis of China: In fact, when considering the military-modernization programs of countries like China, we should be concerned less with their potential ability to challenge the US symmetrically—fighter to fighter or ship to ship—and more with their ability to disrupt our freedom of movement and narrow our strategic options . . . **Investments in cyber and anti-satellite warfare**, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, and ballisticmissiles could threaten America’s primary way to project power and help allies in the Pacific—in particular our forward air bases and carrier strike groups (US Department of Defense 16 September 2009). Gates’ geographical imagination of China in this speech is predicated on two inter-related assumptions that exemplify a political realist “way of seeing”. First, China is not recognized as an “ally” of the US, although it is clear that the US is the key driver of such politics of recognition in the first place. Furthermore, it appears that US military “protection” is a precondition to qualify as an “ally”, a logic which automatically casts states without such “protection” as suspect. Second, China’s military-modernization process is ostensibly a “threat” because such efforts could, in Gates’ terms, “disrupt” the “strategic options” of the US in East Asia, even when it is entirely plausible that increased defense spending is to fulfil other valid purposes, such as replacing obsolete military equipment to address new threats by terrorists and maritime pirates, and enhancing remuneration packages for soldiers. Third, America wants to “project power” on its own terms, which is why it becomes “concerned” when so-called non-allies upgrade their defence technologies. This point is further reaffirmed in the Pentagon’s 2010 **Q**uadrennial **D**efense **R**eview: “**lack of transparency** and the nature of China’s military development and decisionmaking processes raise legitimate questions about its future conduct and intentions within Asia and beyond” (Pentagon 2010:60). However, the extent to which the questions are “legitimate” is clearly a unilateral legal-discursive construction of the US that reflects the enduring effect of political realism in US security thought. These assumptions collectively constitute what Bialasiewicz et al (2007; see also Lott 2004) call America’s “performative” security strategy, through which perceived **insecurities are constructed as ontological facts so that “mitigation” measures could be justified**. A critical assessment of the motivations behind China’s military modernization policies is thus necessary before it can be ascertained whether a “China threat” exists. First, while China is not recognized as a US “ally”, it does not justify its defense modernization programs through anti-US rhetoric. For Chinese policymakers, it does appear that the critical issue is protection and consolidation of its existing territories (more on this in the third section). According to Luo Yuan, a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and senior researcher with the Academy of Military Sciences, “China is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council that has not achieved territorial integrity . . . We need to think more on how to preserve national integrity. We have no intention of challenging the US” (China Daily 4 March 2010). In terms of defense budget, China’s increased 2010 budget, at around US$78 billion, pales in comparison to the proposed expenditure of the US of US$700 billion. Furthermore, the request for China to be “transparent” in its defense policies is a double-standards practice which undermines the sovereign right of a country to devise its own policies, since the Pentagon is not the most “transparent” or accountable where its own policies— **especially the supposed “right” to launch pre-emptive strikes**—are concerned. If anything, then, the massive “power gap” between China and the US should suffice to allay concerns about the former’s so-called “threat” (cf Al-Rodhan 2007). Second, it is interesting that whilst not “allies” in name, the US and Chinese economies are inextricably intertwined as the Chinese government currently generates effective demand for US Treasury financial instruments and holds significant US dollar reserves. In addition, China’s growing geo-economic influence worldwide is contingent on a strategic investment of its foreign reserves**, which means it has every economic incentive to ensure stability** in the global monetary system (see discussion in Lim 2010). Within the US, however, it is possibly this very **geo-economic integration with China** (especially the US Treasury’s increasing dependence on Chinese financial capital and China’s importance as an offshore outsourcing destination for US transnational corporations) which triggers suspicions of China’s “intentions” and which then generate certain reactive measures to deflect attention from the **US economy’s deep-seated problems.** In an insightful analysis, Cohen and DeLong (2010:12–13) argue that the US has had a wonderful opportunity to create new “sectors of the future” because of the willingness of developing countries like China to lend it money; what was created, however, was a finance sector that almost bankrupted the economy and deepened the need for foreign backing to support its “quantitative easing” monetary solution. Because the need to borrow more money from abroad—and China is so far the biggest creditor—could lead to the end of the global politico-economic influence of the US, it is perhaps unsurprising that some political actors choose to politicize this phenomenon. As Waltz (2000:15) puts it, “With zero interdependence, neither conflict nor war is possible. With integration, international becomes national politics”. Then again, if China has no plausible economic motivation to engage in military conflict with the US, the potential for conflict could be attributed to the unilateral and sustained **willingness of the US to accede to Taiwan’s arms purchase requests**, in the knowledge that China views such arms sales as a clear show of support for what it considers its own province. Intriguingly, the US framing of its relations with Taiwan could actually be due to an implicit distrust of putative allies in the East Asian region. Cha (2010:158) theorizes post-World War II US geopolitical alliances with South Korea, Taiwan and Japan as a form of bilateral “powerplay” designed to suppress not only the Soviet threat, but also: to constrain anticommunist allies in the region that might engage in aggressive behavior against adversaries that could entrap the United States in an unwanted larger war. Underscoring the U.S. desire to avoid such an outcome was a belief in the domino theory—that the fall of one small country in Asia could trigger a chain of countries falling to communism. This strategy arguably applies in the present day, despite the demise of the Soviet Union and China’s peaceful integration into the global political economy. For instance, Christensen (1999:50) sees US military presence in East Asia as resolving a “security dilemma” triggered by a tendency for one country, affected profoundly by “historically based mistrust”, to overreact to another country’s acquisition of ostensibly defensive military equipment. What Christensen (1999) does not emphasize, however, is that the US is also a major exporter of such equipment, which makes the “powerplay” logic a doublethink ratiocination. This echoes Cowen and Smith’s (2009:42) the geopolitical calculations of the US—exemplified through the unilaterally crafted TRA and sustained arms sales to Taiwan—**could** indirectly **destabilize the “China region” and possibly even Sino-US geo-economic formations.** aforementioned caveat that “geopolitical calculation is always available when deemed necessary”. Even though the Cold War is officially over, Johnson’s analysis (2005, in Asia Times Online) strongly suggests that the “powerplay” approach remains in full swing: Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the United States has repeatedly pressured Japan to revise Article 9 of its constitution (renouncing the use of force except as a matter of self-defense) and become what US officials call a “normal nation” . . . America’s intention is to turn Japan into what Washington neo-conservatives like to call the “Britain of the Far East”—and then use it as a proxy in checkmating North Korea and balancing China.

#### No China-Taiwan war

Bush, 10

[Richard C Bush III, Director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, “China-Taiwan: Recent Economic, Political, and Military Developments Across the Strait, and Implications for the United States,” 3/18/10, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2010/0318\_china\_economy\_bush.aspx]

What is the trajectory of the current process? Conceptually, there are at least two possibilities. On the one hand, and more consequential, what we are watching might reflect movement toward the resolution of the fundamental dispute between the two sides. One type of resolution would be unification according to the PRC’s one-county, two-systems formula, but there are others. On the other hand, what we are seeing could be the stabilization of cross-Strait relations. That term implies several things: increasing two-way contact, reducing mutual fear, increasing mutual trust and predictability, expanding areas of cooperation, institutionalizing interaction, and so on. It constitutes a shift from the conflicted coexistence of the 1995-2008 period to a more relaxed coexistence. Examples of this process at work are the array of economic agreements that the two sides have concluded, removing obstacles to closer interchange; China’s approval for Taiwan to attend the 2009 meeting of the World Health Assembly; and the two sides’ tacit agreement that neither will steal the other’s diplomatic partners.

In and of itself, stabilization does not lead ineluctably to a resolution of the China-Taiwan dispute—however much Beijing prefers inevitability and however much some in Taiwan fear it. President Ma has been quite explicit that unification will not be discussed during his term of office, whether that is four or eight years. The Chinese leadership at least realizes that the current situation is better than the previous one and understands that resolution will be a long-term process.

Certainly, however, stabilization can create a better climate for resolution. It’s easier to address the tough conceptual issues that are at the heart of this dispute in an environment of greater mutual trust. But I don’t see that happening anytime soon. Stabilization can also evolve very incrementally toward resolution, either through better mutual understanding or because one side, knowingly or unknowingly, makes concessions to the other. How stabilization might migrate to resolution brings me to the Commission’s questions.

China’s Initiatives

Since 2005, and in contrast to past periods, China’s approach to Taiwan has been rather skillful. President Hu Jintao shifted the priority from achieving unification in the near or medium term to opposing Taiwan independence (unification remains the long-term goal). Although he speaks about the need for the two sides to “scrupulously abide by the one-China principle,” he has been prepared, for the sake of achieving substantive progress, to tolerate so far the Ma administration’s quite ambiguous approach to that issue. The Beijing leadership recognizes the importance of building mutual trust through dialogue and exchanges after a decade-plus of mutual fear. It is emphasizing what the two sides have in common—economic cooperation and Chinese culture—and agreed to reduce somewhat the zero-sum competition in the international arena. Through its policies and interactions, it is trying to build up support for a PRC-friendly public on Taiwan. It sees the value of institutionalizing a more stable cross-Strait relationship.

The exception to this trend is the continuation of the People’s Liberation Army’s acquisition of capabilities that are relevant to a Taiwan contingency. Why this build-up continues, in spite of the decline in tensions since President Ma took office, is puzzling. After all, Ma’s policies reduce significantly what Beijing regarded as a serious national security problem. China is more secure today than two years ago, yet it continues to make Taiwan more vulnerable. Possible explanations are rigid procurement schedules; the inability of civilian leaders to impose a change even when it makes policy sense; and a decision to fill out its capacity to coerce and intimidate Taiwan, in case a future Taiwan government challenges China’s fundamental interests. The answer is not clear. I am inclined to believe that it is a combination of the second and third reasons.

What is clear is that this trend is in no one's interests – Taiwan's, China's or the United States'. Taiwan's leaders are unlikely to negotiate seriously on the issues on Beijing's agenda under a darkening cloud of possible coercion and intimidation. The Taiwanese people will not continue to support pro-engagement leaders if they conclude that this policy has made Taiwan less secure. The U.S. will not benefit if mutual fear again pervades the Taiwan Strait.

Where do Current Trends Lead?

To be honest, I do not know. I cannot rule out the possibility that gradually and over time the Taiwan public and political leaders will abandon decades of opposition to one-country, two systems and choose to let Taiwan become a special administrative region of the PRC. But I doubt it. Despite the consciousness on the island of China’s growing power and leverage, there is still a broad consensus that the Republic of China (or Taiwan) is a sovereign state, a position that is inconsistent with China’s formula. Moreover, because of the provisions of the ROC constitution, fundamental change of the sort that Beijing wants would require constitutional amendments and therefore a broad and strong political consensus, which does not exist at this time.

So if political integration is to occur in the next couple of decades, it will occur not because of the cumulative impact of economic integration but because Beijing has decided to make Taiwan an offer that is better than one-country, two systems. So far, I see no sign it will do so.

The more likely future is the continued creation and consolidation of a stabilized order, one in which economic interdependence deepens, social and cultural interaction grows, competition in the international community is muted, and all these arrangements will be institutionalized to one degree or another. But none of this will be automatic. Issues relevant to the resolution of the dispute (e.g. whether Taiwan is a sovereign entity) may come up in the process of stabilization and dealt with in ways that do not hurt either side’s interests And the issue of China’s growing military power—and what it reflects about PLA intentions—remains.

## contention two

#### The war on drugs is an imperial policy

Grupo Espartaquista ‘12 (Grupo Espartaquista de México—a communist worker’s organization in Mexico, 2012, “Mexico: PRI Back at Helm of Capitalist State,” Translated from Spanish, International Communist League, September, Available Online at http://www.icl-fi.org/english/wv/1012/mexico.html)

This situation allows even the corrupt and repressive PRI to pose as a lesser evil, even though Peña Nieto has promised nothing but further austerity, disguised by vague declarations, and more privatizations—notably of [state oil company] PEMEX, about which he has not been vague at all. We say: Down with the privatization of PEMEX and the rest of the energy sector! Down with the draconian labor “reform”!

Additionally, there is widespread loathing for the increasing brutality of the state and criminal gangs carried out under Calderón’s “war on drugs,” which has left over 60,000 dead in the last few years. This “war” has nothing to do with protecting the population but rather with regimenting it, particularly the working class.

The “war on drugs” has also served a purpose in allowing U.S. imperialism to tighten its control over its “backyard.” By 2010, military aid to Mexico had increased seven-fold through the Merida Plan. For the U.S., the “war on drugs” in Mexico serves the same purpose as the “war on terror” elsewhere: the presence of U.S. military and police personnel in Mexico is increasing, while drone flights are now common. Now there’s even talk about an independent U.S. plan—in the style of bin Laden’s execution in 2011—to come into Mexico and hunt down famous drug lord “Chapo” Guzmán.

In the same sense, Peña Nieto has promised a “strategy” change that in reality means business as usual for the Mexican masses: increasing police forces and strengthening intelligence services, particularly in coordination with the U.S. and Central American countries. This has not been enough, however, to convince his untrusting imperialist masters that he will continue the “war on drugs.” James Sensenbrenner, director of the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, complains that during the 71 years of PRI rule, the party “minimized violence by turning a blind eye to the cartels.” On the other hand, the fear caused by the increase in “narco-violence” has stirred some nostalgia for the order of the olden days. Some graffiti mentioned in Proceso magazine, clearly referring to this desperate situation, evocatively read: “Out with the incompetent ones, bring back the corrupt.”

It is the duty of the workers movement as a whole to oppose the “war on drugs,” whose only purpose is to strengthen the repressive powers of the capitalist state. We say: Down with “war on drugs” militarization! FBI, DEA and all U.S. military and police agencies out of Mexico! We call for the decriminalization of drugs, which, by eliminating the superprofits derived from the illegal and underground nature of the drug trade, would reduce crime and its related social pathologies. We also oppose measures by the bourgeois state to restrict or prevent the population from carrying firearms. Gun control laws limit the rights of the population and guarantee that the state and criminals maintain a monopoly of weapons.

#### Terrorists won’t use WMD

Roberts and Moodie 2, Brad, Inst Dfnse Analyses, and Michael, Chem & Bio Arms Cntrl Inst, July (Defense Horizons 15)

The argument about terrorist motivation is also important. Terrorists generally have not killed as many as they have been capable of killing. This restraint seems to derive from an understanding of mass casualty attacks as both unnecessary and counterproductive. They are unnecessary because terrorists, by and large, have succeeded by conventional means. Also, they are counterproductive because they might alienate key constituencies, whether among the public, state sponsors, or the terrorist leadership group. In Brian Jenkins' famous words, terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. Others have argued that the lack of mass casualty terrorism and effective exploitation of BW has been more a matter of accident and good fortune than capability or intent. Adherents of this view, including former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, argue that "it's not a matter of if but when."

The attacks of September 11 would seem to settle the debate about whether terrorists have both the motivation and sophistication to exploit weapons of mass destruction for their full lethal effect. After all, those were terrorist attacks of unprecedented sophistication that seemed clearly aimed at achieving mass casualties--had the World Trade Center towers collapsed as the 1993 bombers had intended, perhaps as many as 150,000 would have died. Moreover, Osama bin Laden's constituency would appear to be not the "Arab street" or some other political entity but his god. And terrorists answerable only to their deity have proven historically to be among the most lethal.

But this debate cannot be considered settled. Bin Laden and his followers could have killed many more on September 11 if killing as many as possible had been their primary objective. They now face the core dilemma of asymmetric warfare: how to escalate without creating new interests for the stronger power and thus the incentive to exploit its power potential more fully. Asymmetric adversaries want their stronger enemies fearful, not fully engaged--militarily or otherwise. They seek to win by preventing the stronger partner from exploiting its full potential. To kill millions in America with biological or other weapons would only commit the United States--and much of the rest of the international community--to the annihilation of the perpetrators.

#### No risk of nuclear terror

**Mueller 10** (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, <http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html>)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

#### Policy to prevent terrorism obscures the role global capital has in both carrying out imperial policies as well as mystifying the role the US plays in constructing danger

Slavoj Zizek, Professor of Sociology at the Institute for Sociology, Ljubljana University, 2002, Revolution at the Gates, p. 234-36

Along the same lines, Rightist commentators like George Will also immediately proclaimed the end of the American “holiday from history” —the impact of reality shattering the isolated tower of the liberal tolerant attitude and the Cultural Studies focus on textuality. Now, we are forced to strike back, to deal with real enemies in the real world. . . . Whom, however, do we strike at? Whatever the response, **it will never hit the right target**, bringing us full satisfaction. The ridicule of America attacking Afghanistan cannot fail to strike us: if the greatest power in the world destroys one of the world’s poorest countries, in which peasants barely survive on barren hills, will this not be the ultimate case of impotent acting out? In many ways Afghanistan is an ideal target: a country that is already reduced to rubble, with no infrastructure, repeatedly destroyed by war for the last two decades ... we cannot avoid the surmise that the choice of Afghanistan will also be **determined by economic considerations**: is it not best procedure to act out one’s anger at a country for which no one cares, and where there is nothing to destroy? Unfortunately, the choice of Afghanistan recalls the anecdote about the madman who searches for a lost key beneath a streetlamp; asked why there, when he lost the key in a dark corner somewhere, he answers: “But it’s easier to search under strong light!” Is it not the ultimate irony that the whole of Kabul already looks like downtown Manhattan? To succumb to the urge to act and retaliate means precisely to **avoid** confronting the true dimensions of what occurred on 11 September — it means an act whose true aim is to lull us into the secure conviction that **nothing has really changed**. The true long-term threats are further acts of **mass terror** in comparison with which the memory of the WTC collapse will pale — acts that are less spectacular, but much more horrifying. What about bacteriological warfare, what about the use of lethal gas, what about the prospect of DNA terrorism (developing poisons which will affect only people who share a determinate genome)? In this new warfare, the agents claim their acts less and less publicly: not only are “terrorists” themselves no longer eager to claim responsibility for their acts (even the notorious Al Qaida did not explicitly appropriate the 11 September attacks, not to mention the mystery about the origins of the anthrax letters); “anti­terrorist” state measures themselves are draped in a shroud of secrecy; all this constitutes an ideal breeding ground for conspiracy theories and generalized social paranoia. And is not the obverse of this paranoiac omnipresence of the invisible war its desubstantialization? So, again, just as we drink beer without alcohol or coffee without caffeine, we are now getting war deprived of its substance — a virtual war fought behind computer screens, a war experienced by its participants as a video game, a war with no casualties (on our side, at least). With the spread of the anthrax panic in October 2001, the West got the first taste of this new “invisible” warfare in which — an aspect we should always bear in mind — we, ordinary citizens, are, with regard to information about what is going on, totally at the mercy of the authorities: we see and hear nothing; all we know comes from the official media. A superpower bombing a desolate desert country and, at the same time, hostage to invisible bacteria — this, not the WTC explosions, is the first image of twenty-first-century warfare. Instead of a quick acting-out, we should confront these difficult questions: what will “war” mean in the twenty-first century? Who will “they” be, if they are, clearly, neither states nor criminal gangs? Here I cannot resist the temptation to recall the Freudian opposition of the public Law and its obscene superego double: along the same lines, are not “international terrorist organizations” the obscene double of the big multi­national corporations — the ultimate rhizomatic machine, omnipresent, yet with no clear territorial base? Are they not the form in which nationalist and/or religious “fundamentalism” accommodated itself to global capital­ism? Do they not embody the ultimate contradiction, with their particular! exclusive content and their global dynamic functioning? For this reason, the fashionable notion of the “clash of civilizations” must be thoroughly rejected: what we are witnessing today, rather, are clashes within each civilization. A brief look at the comparative history of Islam and Christi­anity tells us that the “human rights record” of Islam (to use an anachronistic term) is much better than that of Christianity: in past centuries, Islam was significantly more tolerant towards other religions than Christianity. It is also time to remember that it was through the Arabs that, in the Middle Ages, we in Western Europe regained access to our Ancient Greek legacy. While I do not in any way excuse today’s horrific acts, these facts none the less clearly demon­strate that we are dealing not with a feature inscribed into Islam “as such”, but with the outcome of modern sociopolitical conditions. If we look more closely, what is this “clash of civilizations” really about? Are not all real-life “clashes” clearly related to **global capitalism**? The Muslim “fundamentalist” target is not only global capitalism’s corrosive impact on social life, but also the corrupt “traditionalist” regimes in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and so on. The most **horrifying** slaughters (those in Rwanda, Congo, and Sierra Leone) not only took place — and are taking place — within the same “civilization”, but are also clearly related to the interplay of **global economic interests**. Even in the few cases which would vaguely fit the definition of the “clash of civilisations” (Bosnia and Kosovo, southern Sudan, etc.), the shadow of other interests is easily discernible. A suitable dose of “**economic reductionism**” would therefore be appropriate here: instead of the endless analyses of how Islamic “fundamentalism” is intolerant towards our liberal societies, and other “clash-of-civilization” topics, we should **refocus** our attention on the **economic background** of the conflict — the clash of economic interests, and of the geopolitical interests of the United States itself (how to retain privileged links both with Israel and with conservative Arab regimes like those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait).

# 2NC

## Overview

#### Your obligation is to prioritize the invisible violence of neoliberalism—market society normalizes spectacular violence globally and renders billions disposable—grinding structural inequality is 100% probable and turns the aff

**Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4**

(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

#### Global movements against neoliberal hegemony are emerging now and will be effective – the plan’s consolidation of U.S.-driven economic orthodoxy collapses democracy, causes resource wars, environmental collapse, and extinction

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The dominant economic model based on limitless growth on a limited planet is leading to an overshoot of the human use of the earth’s resources. This is leading to an ecological catastrophe. It is also leading to intense and violent resource grab of the remaining resources of the earth by the rich from the poor. The resource grab is an adjustment by the rich and powerful to a shrinking resource base – land, biodiversity, water – without adjusting the old resource intensive, limitless growth paradigm to the new reality. Its only outcome can be ecological scarcity for the poor in the short term, with deepening poverty and deprivation. In the long run it means the extinction of our species, as climate catastrophe and extinction of other species makes the planet un-inhabitable for human societies. Failure to make an ecological adjustment to planetary limits and ecological justice is a threat to human survival. The Green Economy being pushed at Rio +20 could well become the biggest resource grabs in human history with corporations appropriating the planet’s green wealth, the biodiversity, to become the green oil to make bio-fuel, energy plastics, chemicals – everything that the petrochemical era based on fossil fuels gave us. Movements worldwide have started to say “No to the Green Economy of the 1%”.

But an ecological adjustment is possible, and is happening. This ecological adjustment involves seeing ourselves as a part of the fragile ecological web, not outside and above it, immune from the ecological consequences of our actions. Ecological adjustment also implies that we see ourselves as members of the earth community, sharing the earth’s resources equitably with all species and within the human community. Ecological adjustment requires an end to resource grab, and the privatization of our land, bio diversity and seeds, water and atmosphere. Ecological adjustment is based on the recovery of the commons and the creation of Earth Democracy.

The dominant economic model based on resource monopolies and the rule of an oligarchy is not just in conflict with ecological limits of the planet. It is in conflict with the principles of democracy, and governance by the people, of the people, for the people. The adjustment from the oligarchy is to further strangle democracy and crush civil liberties and people’s freedom. Bharti Mittal’s statement that politics should not interfere with the economy reflects the mindset of the oligarchy that democracy can be done away with. This anti-democratic adjustment includes laws like homeland security in U.S., and multiple security laws in India.

The calls for a democratic adjustment from below are witnessed worldwide in the rise of non-violent protests, from the Arab spring to the American autumn of “Occupy” and the Russian winter challenging the hijack of elections and electoral democracy.

And these movements for democratic adjustment are also rising everywhere in response to the “austerity” programmes imposed by IMF, World Bank and financial institutions which created the financial crisis. The Third World had its structural Adjustment and Forced Austerity, through the 1980s and 1990s, leading to IMF riots. India’s structural adjustment of 1991 has given us the agrarian crisis with quarter million farmer suicides and food crisis pushing every 4th Indian to hunger and every 2nd Indian child to severe malnutrition; people are paying with their very lives for adjustment imposed by the World Bank/IMF. The trade liberalization reforms dismantled our food security system, based on universal PDS. It opened up the seed sector to seed MNCs. And now an attempt is being made through the Food Security Act to make our public feeding programmes a market for food MNCs. The forced austerity continues through imposition of so called reforms, such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in retail, which would rob 50 million of their livelihoods in retail and millions more by changing the production system. Europe started having its forced austerity in 2010. And everywhere there are anti-austerity protests from U.K., to Italy, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Iceland, and Portugal. The banks which have created the crisis want society to adjust by destroying jobs and livelihoods, pensions and social security, public services and the commons. The people want financial systems to adjust to the limits set by nature, social justice and democracy. And the precariousness of the living conditions of the 99% has created a new class which Guy Standing calls the “Precariate”. If the Industrial Revolution gave us the industrial working class, the proletariat, globalization and the “free market” which is destroying the livelihoods of peasants in India and China through land grabs, or the chances of economic security for the young in what were the rich industrialized countries, has created a global class of the precarious. As Barbara Ehrenreich and John Ehrenreich have written in “The making of the American 99%”, this new class of the dispossessed and excluded include “middle class professional, factory workers, truck drivers, and nurses as well as the much poorer people who clean the houses, manicure the fingernails, and maintain the lawn of the affluent”.

Forced austerity based on the old paradigm allows the 1% super rich, the oligarchs, to grab the planets resources while pushing out the 99% from access to resources, livelihoods, jobs and any form of freedom, democracy and economic security. It is often said that with increasing growth, India and China are replicating the resource intensive and wasteful lifestyles of the Western countries. The reality is that while a small 3 to 4% of India is joining the mad race for consuming the earth with more and more automobiles and air conditioners, the large majority of India is being pushed into “de-consumption” – losing their entitlements to basic needs of food and water because of resource and land grab, market grab, and destruction of livelihoods. The hunger and malnutrition crisis in India is an example of the “de-consumption” forced on the poor by the rich, through the imposed austerity built into the trade liberalization and “economic reform” policies.

There is another paradigm emerging which is shared by Gandhi and the new movements of the 99%, the paradigm of voluntary simplicity of reducing one ecological foot print while increasing human well being for all. Instead of forced austerity that helps the rich become super rich, the powerful become totalitarian, chosen simplicity enables us all to adjust ecologically, to reduce over consumption of the planets resources, it allows us to adjust socially to enhance democracy and it creates a path for economic adjustment based on justice and equity.

Forced austerity makes the poor and working families pay for the excesses of limitless greed and accumulation by the super rich. Chosen simplicity stops these excesses and allow us to flower into an Earth Democracy where the rights and freedoms of all species and all people are protected and respected.

## Turns Case

#### Neoliberal governance destroys Mexican democracy – countless empirics

MSN No Date – Mexico Solidarity Network; “Mexico - A neoliberal experiment”; <http://www.mexicosolidarity.org/programs/alternativeeconomy/neoliberalism>

In addition to these three central historic moments, other events carry weight in defining the neoliberal model. **The 1995 peso crisis generated** US$50 billion in emergency loans from the IMF and an additional US$20 billion from the Clinton administration, in exchange for virtual veto power by the US Treasury over Mexico's economic decisions for the next decade. This is characteristic of perhaps the most profound and important element of neoliberalism - the usurpation of democracy - a characteristic that cuts across nearly every element of the neoliberal model. Increasingly, transnational corporations and the political powers that defend their interests are gaining power at the expense of civil society, which often spent generations of struggle to win rights and protections. The neoliberal model removes economic decisions from the political arena and places them in the invisible hands of the market. In practice, this means that economic decisions that have wide-ranging impacts on society are placed in the hands of private corporations. The loss of democracy is not an abstract, academic question. It is having a serious impact on the ability of people to control their lives and the future of their communities. The loss of democracy will have far-reaching consequences for generations to come.

**IMF Structural Adjustment Programs** are one of the best examples. The US Treasury Department, in the form of the IMF, is writing economic policy for countries around the world, using foreign debt as leverage to force Southern nations to adopt neoliberal policies. It should be noted that ruling elites in the South, the new "technocrats," many of whom received training at US universities, are generally in agreement with these neoliberal initiatives. After all, they gain almost as much under the neoliberal model as their US counterparts. However, local elites do not enjoy sufficient popular support to initiate neoliberal policies without the "cover" offered by the IMF. The fact that the IMF "forces" these elites to accept these policies is a direct appropriation of democracy.

The Chapter 11 provisions of **NAFTA** that allow corporations to sue governments before secret tribunals are another direct threat to democracy. This legal instrument is relatively new, and in the case of Mexico and the United States, it is the first time that either country has agreed to participate in such a dispute settlement mechanism. Although Chapter 11 has only been in effect for ten years, and corporate legal counsels only recently began to experiment seriously with the mechanism, there are already several cases that are indicative of the dramatic loss of democracy.

In January 1997, Metalclad Corporation of Newport Beach, California, filed a complaint under NAFTA alleging that the state of San Luis Potosí violated NAFTA provisions when it prevented the company from expanding a waste disposal plant. In 1991 Metalclad purchased the facility, which had a history of contaminating local groundwater, with the obligation to clean up pre-existing contaminants. After an environmental impact assessment revealed that the site lies atop an ecologically sensitive underground stream, the Governor refused to allow Metalclad to reopen the facility. Eventually, the Governor declared the site part of a 600,000 acre ecological zone. Although Metalclad never received the necessary local permits, the company claims this action was effectively an expropriation and inhibited the company's ability to make profits. In August of 2000, a secret NAFTA tribunal awarded Metalclad $16.7 million in damages. Apparently the private profits of Metalclad are more important than protection of the community's groundwater.

In April 1997, Canada imposed a ban on the gasoline additive MMT. Some US states also ban MMT, whose primary ingredient, manganese, is a known human neurotoxin. Ethyl Corporation, the main producer of MMT, responded to Canada's public health law with a $250 million lawsuit, claiming the law violated its investor protections under NAFTA. Ethyl argued that the law was an "expropriation" of its assets because it would eliminate expected profits from Canadian sales of the additive. The Canadian government settled the suit, agreeing to pay Ethyl $13 million in damages and cover the company's legal costs. It also proclaimed publicly that MMT is "safe" - contradicting the position of its national environmental protection agency.

The Methanex Corporation of Vancouver produces MTBE, an oxidant used as a gasoline additive to improve combustion efficiency. MTBE is highly carcinogenic, and for several years has been contaminating California groundwater. The California Assembly passed a law prohibiting the use of MTBE, a reasonable response to extensive drinking water contamination by a known carcinogen. Methanex sued the State of California for $970 million, for the loss of potential profits from possible future sales of MTBE in California. As of this writing, the case is still pending, complicated by the fact that former Governor Grey Davis apparently accepted substantial campaign contributions from the ethanol lobby, Methanex's main competitor. If decided in favor of Methanex, it will likely be interpreted as open season for corporations to sue for loss of all kinds of "future profits." Even if Methanex loses, local governments will think twice before approving environmental laws that may offend transnational corporations with deep legal pockets.

While the three examples sited above deal with environmental issues, NAFTA rules make almost anything fair game. For example, a city government trying to protect local jobs could be prohibited § Marked 08:34 § from offering concessionary loans or preferential purchases to a local company if a transnational corporation wants to compete in the same market. Subsidies (read tax dollars) for public education could be challenged as an unfair business practice if a transnational corporation promoting private schools decides to compete in the same market. The postal system could be threatened as an unfair monopoly, with private companies picking off profitable routes while leaving relatively costly inner city and rural deliveries to the government (this challenge is already being made in Canada by FedEx). NAFTA foretells a world of decreasing public spaces, where private corporations make the vast majority of decisions that affect our lives, not based on a sense of the common good but based solely on the corporate bottom line.

Obviously trans-national corporations enjoy important and enforceable new rights under NAFTA, but what about workers? To understand the full extent of NAFTA, let's look at the labor side accords that were tacked on after the AFL-CIO complained loudly. Under the side agreements, known as the North American Agreement for Labor Cooperation (NAALC), workers can file complaints for failure to apply existing labor standards. Of the 21 cases filed to date, one-third deal with health and safety standards that already exist in national law. A review panel investigates the complaint and produces a report. However, the offending corporation can do anything it pleases with the report, including throwing it in the wastebasket if it so chooses. Unlike Chapter 11 provisions, there are no enforcement mechanisms attached to the labor side agreements.

While all of the above-mentioned examples are important, the most significant threat to democracy is also the main constituent of the neoliberal model - the corporation. In an ostensibly democratic country like the United States, it has always amazed this author that large segments of the population are willing to live in virtual dictatorships - called corporations - for one-third or more of their waking hours. No institution present in modern society is less democratic than the corporation. A small cabal of directors and managers exercise virtual dictatorial control over a workforce that, for example in the case of WalMart, numbers in the millions. And this same small group of people decides how to invest and spend billions of dollars in profits that are earned because of the hard work of employees. Not even a hint of democracy to be found, yet the corporation is at the center of modern society, directing production and consumption patterns, use of natural resources, and public policies (via control of the political process through millions of dollars in donations). What could be more undemocratic!

The neoliberal model expands the power of corporations by removing economic decisions from the political realm. Less government (read less democracy) is the rallying cry, and many people who wait in long lines to get a drivers license, hate to pay income taxes or find today's political class unpalatable agree. But the implication of less democracy is more corporate control, a result that any thinking being would object to in principle and in fact.

## FW

#### Be skeptical of their evidence—market forces determine the truth value of knowledge production

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Across the globe, the forces of casino capitalism are on the march. With the return of the Gilded Age and its dream worlds of consumption, privatization and deregulation, not only are democratic values and social protections at risk, but the civic and formative cultures that make such values and protections crucial to democratic life are in danger of disappearing altogether. As public spheres, once enlivened by broad engagements with common concerns, are being transformed into "spectacular spaces of consumption," the flight from mutual obligations and social responsibilities intensifies and has resulted in what Tony Judt identifies as a "loss of faith in the culture of open democracy."4 This loss of faith in the power of public dialogue and dissent is not unrelated to the diminished belief in higher education as central to producing critical citizens and a crucial democratic public sphere in its own right. At stake here is not only the meaning and purpose of higher education, but also civil society, politics and the fate of democracy itself. Thomas Frank is on target when he argues that "Over the course of the past few decades, the power of concentrated money has subverted professions, destroyed small investors, wrecked the regulatory state, corrupted legislators en masse and repeatedly put the economy through the wringer. Now it has come for our democracy itself."5 And, yet, the only questions being asked about knowledge production, the purpose of education, the nature of politics, and our understanding of the future are determined largely by market forces.

The mantras of neoliberalism are now well known: Government is the problem; Society is a fiction; Sovereignty is market-driven; Deregulation and commodification are vehicles for freedom; and Higher education should serve corporate interests rather than the public good. In addition, the yardstick of profit has become the only viable measure of the good life, while civic engagement and public spheres devoted to the common good are viewed by many politicians and their publics as either a hindrance to the goals of a market-driven society or alibis for government inefficiency and waste.

#### Critical intellectualism solves extinction—the ballot matters

Jones ‘99

IR, Aberystwyth (Richard, “6. Emancipation: Reconceptualizing Practice,” Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones06.html)

The central political task of the intellectuals is to aid in the construction of a counterhegemony and thus undermine the prevailing patterns of discourse and interaction that make up the currently dominant hegemony. **This** task **is accomplished through educational activity**, because, as Gramsci argues, “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350). Discussing the relationship of the “philosophy of praxis” to political practice, Gramsci claims: It [the theory] does not tend to leave the “simple” in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead them to a higher conception of life. If it affirms the need for contact between intellectuals and “simple” it is not in order to restrict scientific activity and preserve unity at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order to construct an intellectual–moral bloc which can make politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small intellectual groups. (Gramsci 1971: 332–333) According to Gramsci, this attempt to construct an alternative “intellectual–moral bloc” should take place under the auspices of the Communist Party—a body he described as the “modern prince.” Just as Niccolò Machiavelli hoped to see a prince unite Italy, rid the country of foreign barbarians, and create a virtù–ous state, Gramsci believed that the modern prince could lead the working class on its journey toward its revolutionary destiny of an emancipated society (Gramsci 1971: 125–205). Gramsci’s relative optimism about the possibility of progressive theorists playing a constructive role in emancipatory political practice was predicated on his belief in the existence of a universal class (a class whose emancipation would inevitably presage the emancipation of humanity itself) with revolutionary potential. It was a gradual loss of faith in this axiom that led Horkheimer and Adorno to their extremely pessimistic prognosis about the possibilities of progressive social change. But does a loss of faith in the revolutionary vocation of the proletariat necessarily lead to the kind of quietism ultimately embraced by the first generation of the Frankfurt School? The conflict that erupted in the 1960s between them and their more radical students suggests not. Indeed, contemporary critical theorists claim that the deprivileging of the role of the proletariat in the struggle for emancipation is actually a positive move. Class remains a very important axis of domination in society, but it is not the only such axis (Fraser 1995). Nor is it valid to reduce all other forms of domination—for example, in the case of gender—to class relations, as orthodox Marxists tend to do. To recognize these points is not only a first step toward the development of an analysis of forms of exploitation and exclusion within society that is more attuned to social reality; it is also a realization that there are other forms of emancipatory politics than those associated with class conflict. 1 This in turn suggests new possibilities and problems for emancipatory theory. Furthermore, the abandonment of faith in revolutionary parties is also a positive development. The history of the European left during the twentieth century provides myriad examples of the ways in which the fetishization of party organizations has led to bureaucratic immobility and the confusion of means with ends (see, for example, Salvadori 1990). The failure of the Bolshevik experiment illustrates how disciplined, vanguard parties are an ideal vehicle for totalitarian domination (Serge 1984). Faith in the “infallible party” has obviously been the source of strength and comfort to many in this period and, as the experience of the southern Wales coalfield demonstrates, has inspired brave and progressive behavior (see, for example, the account of support for the Spanish Republic in Francis 1984). But such parties have so often been the enemies of emancipation that they should be treated with the utmost caution. Parties are necessary, but their fetishization is potentially disastrous. History furnishes examples of progressive developments that have been positively influenced by organic intellectuals operating outside the bounds of a particular party structure (G. Williams 1984). Some of these developments have occurred in the particularly intractable realm of security. These examples may be considered as “resources of hope” for critical security studies (R. Williams 1989). They illustrate that ideas are important or, more correctly, that change is the product of the dialectical interaction of ideas and material reality. One clear security–related example of the role of critical thinking and critical thinkers in aiding and abetting progressive social change is the experience of the peace movement of the 1980s. At that time the ideas of dissident defense intellectuals (the “alternative defense” school) encouraged and drew strength from peace activism. Together they had an effect not only on short–term policy but on the dominant discourses of strategy and security**, a far more important result in the long run.** The synergy between critical security intellectuals and critical social movements and the potential influence of both working in tandem can be witnessed particularly clearly in the fate of common security. As Thomas Risse–Kappen points out, the term “common security” originated in the contribution of peace researchers to the German security debate of the 1970s (Risse–Kappen 1994: 186ff.); it was subsequently popularized by the Palme Commission report (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982). Initially, mainstream defense intellectuals dismissed the concept as hopelessly idealistic; it certainly had no place in their allegedly hardheaded and realist view of the world. However, notions of common security were taken up by a number of different intellectual communities, including the liberal arms control community in the United States, Western European peace researchers, security specialists in the center–left political parties of Western Europe, and Soviet “institutchiks”—members of the influential policy institutes in the Soviet Union such as the United States of America and Canada Institute (Landau 1996: 52–54; Risse–Kappen 1994: 196–200; Kaldor 1995; Spencer 1995). These communities were subsequently able to take advantage of public pressure exerted through social movements in order to gain broader acceptance for common security. In Germany, for example, “in response to social movement pressure, German social organizations such as churches and trade unions quickly supported the ideas promoted by peace researchers and the SPD” (Risse–Kappen 1994: 207). Similar pressures even had an effect on the Reagan administration. As Risse–Kappen notes: When the Reagan administration brought hard–liners into power, the US arms control community was removed from policy influence. It was the American peace movement and what became known as the “freeze campaign” that revived the arms control process together with pressure from the European allies. (Risse–Kappen 1994: 205; also Cortright 1993: 90–110) Although it would be difficult to sustain a claim that the combination of critical movements and **intellectuals** persuaded the Reagan government to adopt the rhetoric and substance of common security in its entirety, it is clear that it did at least **have a substantial impact on ameliorating U.S. behavior. § Marked 08:35 §** The most dramatic and certainly the most unexpected impact of alternative defense ideas was felt in the Soviet Union. Through various East–West links, which included arms control institutions, Pugwash conferences, interparty contacts, and even direct personal links, a coterie of Soviet policy analysts and advisers were drawn toward common security and such attendant notions as “nonoffensive defense” (these links are detailed in Evangelista 1995; Kaldor 1995; Checkel 1993; Risse–Kappen 1994; Landau 1996 and Spencer 1995 concentrate on the role of the Pugwash conferences). This group, including Palme Commission member Georgii Arbatov, Pugwash attendee Andrei Kokoshin, and Sergei Karaganov, a senior adviser who was in regular contact with the Western peace researchers Anders Boserup and Lutz Unterseher (Risse–Kappen 1994: 203), then influenced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev’s subsequent championing of common security may be attributed to several factors. It is clear, for example, that new Soviet leadership had a strong interest in alleviating tensions in East–West relations in order to facilitate much–needed domestic reforms (“the interaction of ideas and material reality”). But what is significant is that the Soviets’ commitment to common security led to significant changes in force sizes and postures. These in turn aided in the winding down of the Cold War, the end of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, and even the collapse of Russian control over much of the territory of the former Soviet Union. At the present time, in marked contrast to the situation in the early 1980s, common security is part of the common sense of security discourse. As MccGwire points out, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (a common defense pact) is using the rhetoric of common security in order to justify its expansion into Eastern Europe (MccGwire 1997). This points to an interesting and potentially important aspect of the impact of ideas on politics. As concepts such as common security, and collective security before it (Claude 1984: 223–260), are adopted by governments and military services, they inevitably become somewhat debased. The hope is that enough of the residual meaning can survive to **shift the parameters of the debate** in a potentially progressive direction. Moreover, the adoption of the concept of common security by official circles provides critics with a useful tool for (immanently) critiquing aspects of security policy (as MccGwire 1997 demonstrates in relation to NATO expansion). The example of common security is highly instructive. First, it indicates that critical intellectuals can be politically engaged and play a role—a significant one at that—in making the world a better and safer place. Second, it points to potential future addressees for critical international theory in general, and critical security studies in particular. Third, it also underlines the role of ideas in the evolution of society. Although most proponents of critical security studies reject aspects of Gramsci’s theory of organic intellectuals, in particular his exclusive concentration on class and his emphasis on the guiding role of the party, the desire for engagement and relevance must remain at the heart of their project. The example of the peace movement suggests that critical theorists can still play the role of organic intellectuals and that this organic relationship need not confine itself to a single class; it can involve alignment with different coalitions of social movements that campaign on an issue or a series of issues pertinent to the struggle for emancipation (Shaw 1994b; R. Walker 1994). Edward Said captures this broader orientation when he suggests that critical intellectuals “are always tied to and ought to remain an organic part of an ongoing experience in society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless” (Said 1994: 84). In the specific case of critical security studies, this means placing the experience of those men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security at the center of the agenda and making suffering humanity rather than raison d’état the prism through which problems are viewed. Here the project stands full–square within the critical theory tradition. If “all theory is for someone and for some purpose,” then critical security studies is for “the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless,” and its purpose is their emancipation. The theoretical implications of this orientation have already been discussed in the previous chapters. They involve a fundamental reconceptualization of security with a shift in referent object and a broadening of the range of issues considered as a legitimate part of the discourse. They also involve a reconceptualization of strategy within this expanded notion of security. But the question remains at the conceptual level of how these alternative types of theorizing—even if they are self–consciously aligned to the practices of critical or new social movements, such as peace activism, the struggle for human rights, and the survival of minority cultures—can become “a force for the direction of action.” Again, Gramsci’s work is insightful. In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci advances a sophisticated analysis of how dominant discourses play a vital role in upholding particular political and economic orders, or, in Gramsci’s terminology, “historic blocs” (Gramsci 1971: 323–377). Gramsci adopted Machiavelli’s view of power as a centaur, half man, half beast: a mixture of consent and coercion. Consent is produced and reproduced by a ruling hegemony that holds sway through civil society and through which ruling or dominant ideas become widely dispersed. 2 In particular, Gramsci describes how ideology becomes sedimented in society and takes on the status of common sense; it becomes subconsciously accepted and even regarded as beyond question. **Obviously**, for Gramsci, **there is nothing immutable about the values that permeate society; they can and do change.** In the social realm, ideas and institutions that were once seen as natural and beyond question (i.e., commonsensical) in the West, such as feudalism and slavery, are now seen as anachronistic, unjust, and unacceptable. In Marx’s well–worn phrase, “All that is solid melts into the air.” Gramsci’s intention is to harness this potential for change and ensure that it moves in the direction of emancipation. To do this he suggests a strategy of a “war of position” (Gramsci 1971: 229–239). Gramsci argues that in states with developed civil societies, such as those in Western liberal democracies, any successful attempt at progressive **social change requires** a slow, **incremental**, even **molecular, struggle** to break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an alternative counterhegemony to take its place. Organic intellectuals have a crucial role to play in this process by helping to undermine the “natural,” “commonsense,” internalized nature of the status quo. This in turn helps create political space within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed and new historic blocs created. I contend that Gramsci’s strategy of a war of position suggests an appropriate model for proponents of critical security studies to adopt in relating their theorizing to political practice. The Tasks of Critical Security Studies If the project of critical security studies is conceived in terms of a war of position, then the main task of those intellectuals who align themselves with the enterprise is to attempt to undermine the prevailing hegemonic security discourse. This may be accomplished by utilizing specialist information and expertise to engage in an immanent critique of the prevailing security regimes, that is, comparing the justifications of those regimes with actual outcomes. When this is attempted in the security field, the prevailing structures and regimes are found to fail grievously on their own terms. Such an approach also involves challenging the pronouncements of those intellectuals, traditional or organic, whose views serve to legitimate, and hence reproduce, the prevailing world order. This challenge entails teasing out the often subconscious and certainly unexamined assumptions that underlie their arguments while **drawing attention to the normative viewpoints that are smuggled into mainstream thinking** about security behind its positivist facade. In this sense, proponents of critical security studies approximate to Foucault’s notion of “specific intellectuals” who use their expert knowledge to challenge the prevailing “regime of truth” (Foucault 1980: 132). However, critical theorists might wish to reformulate this sentiment along more familiar Quaker lines of “speaking truth to power” (this sentiment is also central to Said 1994) or even along the eisteddfod lines of speaking “truth against the world.” Of course, traditional strategists can, and indeed do, sometimes claim a similar role. Colin S. Gray, for example, states that “strategists must be prepared to ‘speak truth to power’” (Gray 1982a: 193). But the difference between Gray and proponents of critical security studies is that, whereas the former seeks to influence policymakers in particular directions without questioning the basis of their power, the latter aim at a thoroughgoing critique of all that traditional security studies has taken for granted. Furthermore, critical theorists base their critique on the presupposition, elegantly stated by Adorno, that “the need to lend suffering a voice is the precondition of all truth” (cited in Jameson 1990: 66). The aim of critical security studies in attempting to undermine the prevailing orthodoxy is ultimately educational. As Gramsci notes, “Every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350; see also the discussion of critical pedagogy in Neufeld 1995: 116–121). Thus, by criticizing the hegemonic discourse and advancing alternative conceptions of security based on different understandings of human potentialities, the approach is simultaneously playing a part in eroding the legitimacy of the ruling historic bloc and contributing to the development of a counterhegemonic position. There are a number of avenues open to critical security specialists in pursuing this educational strategy. As teachers, they can try to foster and encourage skepticism toward accepted wisdom and open minds to other possibilities. They can also take advantage of the seemingly unquenchable thirst of the media for instant punditry to forward alternative views onto a broader stage. Nancy Fraser argues: “As teachers, we try to foster an emergent pedagogical counterculture.... As critical public intellectuals we try to inject our perspectives into whatever cultural or political public spheres we have access to” (Fraser 1989: 11). Perhaps significantly, support for this type of emancipatory strategy can even be found in the work of the ultrapessimistic Adorno, who argues: In the history of civilization there have been not a few instances when delusions were healed not by focused propaganda, but, in the final analysis, because scholars, with their unobtrusive yet insistent work habits, studied what lay at the root of the delusion. (cited in Kellner 1992: vii) Such “unobtrusive yet insistent work” does not in itself create the social change to which Adorno alludes. The conceptual and the practical **dangers of collapsing practice into theory must be guarded against**. Rather, **through** their **educational** **activities**, proponents of critical security studies should aim to provide support for those social movements that promote emancipatory social change. By providing a critique of the prevailing order and legitimating alternative views, **critical theorists** can **perform a valuable role in** supporting the struggles of **social movements**. That said, the role of theorists is not to direct and instruct those movements with which they are aligned; instead, the relationship is reciprocal. The experience of the European, North American, and Antipodean peace movements of the 1980s shows how influential social movements can become when their efforts are harnessed to the intellectual and educational activity of critical thinkers. For example, in his account of New Zealand’s antinuclear stance in the 1980s, Michael C. Pugh cites the importance of the visits of critical intellectuals such as Helen Caldicott and Richard Falk in changing the country’s political climate and encouraging the growth of the antinuclear movement (Pugh 1989: 108; see also Cortright 1993: 5–13). In the 1980s peace movements and critical intellectuals interested in issues of security and strategy drew strength and succor from each other’s efforts. If such critical social movements do not exist, then this creates obvious difficulties for the critical theorist. But even under these circumstances, the theorist need not abandon all hope of an eventual orientation toward practice. Once again, the peace movement of the 1980s provides evidence of the possibilities. At that time, the movement benefited from the intellectual work undertaken in the lean years of the peace movement in the late 1970s. Some of the theories and concepts developed then, such as common security and nonoffensive defense, were eventually taken up even in the Kremlin and played a significant role in defusing the second Cold War. Those ideas developed in the 1970s can be seen in Adornian terms of a “message in a bottle,” but in this case, contra Adorno’s expectations, they were picked up and used to support a program of emancipatory political practice. Obviously, one would be naive to understate the difficulties facing those attempting to develop alternative critical approaches within academia. Some of these problems have been alluded to already and involve the structural constraints of academic life itself. Said argues that many problems are caused by what he describes as the growing “professionalisation” of academic life (Said 1994: 49–62). Academics are now so constrained by the requirements of job security and marketability that they are extremely risk–averse. It pays—in all senses—to stick with the crowd and avoid the exposed limb by following the prevalent disciplinary preoccupations, publish in certain prescribed journals, and so on. The result is the navel gazing so prevalent in the study of international relations and the seeming inability of security specialists to deal with the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War (Kristensen 1997 highlights the search of U.S. nuclear planners for “new targets for old weapons”). And, of course, the pressures for conformism are heightened in the field of security studies when governments have a very real interest in marginalizing dissent. Nevertheless, opportunities for critical thinking do exist, and this thinking can connect with the practices of social movements and become a “force for the direction of action.” The experience of the 1980s, when, in the depths of the second Cold War, critical thinkers risked demonization and in some countries far worse in order to challenge received wisdom, thus arguably playing a crucial role in the very survival of the human race, should act as both an inspiration and a challenge to critical security studies.

#### Their FW is politically disempowering—fiat lets us off the hook for our own responsibility in cultivating social change

Kappeler 95

(Susanne, The Will to Violence, p. 10-11)

We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equival­ent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness’ and its accompanying phe­nomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the respons­ibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or­ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' our readiness, in other words, to build ident­ities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence. “destining” of revealing insofar as it “pushes” us in a certain direction. Heidegger does not regard destining as determination (he says it is not a “fate which compels”), but rather as the implicit project within the field of modern practices to subject all aspects of reality to the principles of order and efficiency, and to pursue reality down to the finest detail. Thus, insofar as modern technology aims to order and render calculable, the objectification of reality tends to take the form of an increasing classification, differentiation, and fragmentation of reality. The possibilities for how things appear are increasingly reduced to those that enhance calculative activities. Heidegger perceives the real danger in the modern age to be that human beings will continue to regard technology as a mere instrument and fail to inquire into its essence. He fears that all revealing will become calculative and all relations technical, that the unthought horizon of revealing, namely the “concealed” background practices that make technological thinking possible, will be forgotten. He remarks: The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve. *(QT,* 33) 10 Therefore, it is not technology, or science, but rather the essence of technology as a way of revealing that constitutes the danger; for the essence of technology is existential*,* not technological. 11 **It is a matter of how** **human** being**s are fundamentally oriented toward their** **world** vis a vis their practices, skills, habits, customs, and so forth. Humanism contributes to this danger insofar as it fosters the illusion that technology is the result of a collective human choice and therefore subject to human control. 12

## AT: Perm

#### 3) Tax information sharing agreements are a form of neocolonial coercion

Christians 12 (Allison, H. Heward Stikeman Chair in the Law of Taxation at the McGill University Faculty of Law. Her research and teaching focus on national and international tax law and policy issues, with emphasis on the relationship between taxation and economic development and on the role of government and non-government institutions and actors in the creation of tax policy norms, 12/12, http://taxpol.blogspot.com/2012/12/iga-flurry-shows-us-is-locking-down-on.html,Tax, Society, 26 Culture, "IGA flurry shows US is locking down on FATCA")

The first thing the parity between the model and the actual agreement with Mexico suggests is that the terms of agreement on FATCA are absolutely non-negotiable. This is a put up or shut up, my way or the highway moment: sign our template or face sanctions in the form of draconian and even unprecedented (such as in the treatment of gross sales proceeds) gross basis withholding. That's hard enough on its own but it is also bad news for other countries that might see themselves in a position to drive a hard bargain with the US. It is bad news not only because it looks like the US will not deviate from its chosen path right now, but also because, perversely, the US has included a "most favored nation" clause in the FATCA agreements--something almost unheard of in double tax agreements, because it makes a better deal for one a better deal for all. The language is in article 7 of the model, and it reads virtually identically in the US-Mexico agreement, the UK agreement, and the Denmark agreement (signed Nov 15 2012).¶ Consistency in the Application of FATCA to Partner Jurisdictions ¶ 1. [FATCA Partner] shall be granted the benefit of any more favorable terms under Article 4 or Annex I of this Agreement relating to the application of FATCA to [FATCA Partner] Financial Institutions afforded to another Partner Jurisdiction .... ¶ 2. The United States shall notify [FATCA Partner] of any such more favorable terms and shall apply such more favorable terms automatically under this Agreement as if they were specified in this Agreement and effective as of the date of the entry into force of the agreement incorporating the more favorable terms. ¶ The implication is that the US is tying its own hands against the possibility of making any different deal for any other country. Now why on earth would they do that? ¶ Purely, I think, to drive home the unilateral message. Information sharing is no longer going to be multilateral, engaged in through international dialogue and consensus. Information is a commodity, the US can apparently afford to extract it on a unilateral basis and without regard to "issues" like other countries' domestic laws, and there will be no spoils for any other country that can't or won't submit to the US standard, even if they themselves are victims of the US' own bank secrecy & notorious apathy when it comes to things like anonymous incorporation.

#### 4) Bilateral agreements are reached under the threat of penalty

Deloitte 12 (FATCA – From worldwide imposed to bilaterally negotiated?, http://www.abbl.lu/node/51269)

As well-know, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”) of 2010 will be applicable as from 1 January 2013. Foreign Financial Intermediaries (“FFIs”) worldwide need to assess whether to enter into an FFI Agreement with the IRS or not, knowing that not participating will in many cases not be an option in view of the 30% punitive withholding tax. In order to avoid possible exposure in the hands of an FFI to such punitive tax regarding its own revenue streams, an FFI Agreement should be signed with the IRS before 1 July 2013 (the application process is expected to be opened as from 1 January 2013). Only in this case does the IRS guarantee that an FFI will be formally registered as a participating FFI before 1 January 2014 (i.e. before the first withholding phase kicks in).¶ Since the draft Regulations were made available by the IRS in February this year, impact assessment and implementation projects carried out by the financial world accelerated rapidly. These draft Regulations (although still possibly subject to change) indeed contain sufficient detail to progress significantly with FATCA implementation projects.¶ However another important development has seen a growing number of jurisdictions starting negotiations with the US on alternative approaches for implementing FATCA. These alternative approaches are based on bilateral intergovernmental agreements (“IGAs”). In this article, we will comment on the reasons why certain states have started this process, what are the main types of draft model IGA available or under construction, how these various models compare, and what may be the advantages and disadvantages of such IGA for the industry.¶ An alternative approach – IGAs¶ Complying with FATCA requirements may cause significant compliance costs for FFIs. Even more importantly, in some jurisdictions, FFIs might be at risk of breaching local data protection, anti-discrimination, confidentiality and bank secrecy rules if they comply with FATCA requirements. Finally, the requirement to withhold the 30% withholding tax on pass-thru payments to recalcitrant account holders or non-participating FFIs, respectively to determine and to publish the pass-thru payment percentage may give rise to significant technical issues.¶ In light of these considerations France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom have agreed with the United States to explore a common approach to FATCA implementation through domestic reporting and reciprocal automatic exchange based on existing bilateral tax treaties. Switzerland and Japan have followed this example and entered into negotiations with the United States, according to the joint statements that have been issued, based on a different approach. Until now, almost 50 countries seem to be interested in entering into IGAs with the United States. It seems that IGAs currently under negotiation between the United States and the European FATCA partners plus Switzerland and Japan would be used as templates for future IGAs.

## AT: Inevitable

Human nature can be changed—it’s not set in advance and pedagogical transformation in this debate can change economic preference formation

Schor ’10 (Julie, Prof. of Economics @ Boston College, Plenitude: The New Economics of True Wealth, pgs. 11-12)

And we don't have to. What's odd about the narrowness of the national economic conversation is that it leaves out theoretical advances in economics and related fields that have begun to change our basic understandings of what motivates and enriches people. The policy conversation hasn't caught up to what's happening at the fore- front of the discipline. One of the hallmarks of the standard economic model, which hails from the nineteenth century, is that people are considered relatively unchanging. Basic preferences, likes and dislikes, are assumed to be stable, and don't adjust as a result of the choices people make or the circumstances in which they find themselves. People alter their behavior in response to changes in prices and incomes, to be sure, and sometimes rapidly. But there are no feedback loops from today's choices to tomorrow's desires. This accords with an old formulation of human nature as fixed, and this view still dominates the policy conversation. However, there's a growing body of research that attests to human adaptability. Newer thinking in behavioral economics, cultural evolution, and social networking that has developed as a result of interdisciplinary work in psychology, biology, and sociology yields a view of humans as far more malleable. It's the economic analogue to recent findings in neuroscience that the brain is more plastic than previously understood, or in biology that human evolution is happening on a time scale more compressed than scientists originally thought. As economic actors, we can change, § Marked 08:35 § too. This has profound implications for our ability to shift from one way of living to another, and to be better off in the process. It's an important part of why we can both reduce ecological impact and improve well- being. As we transform our lifestyles, we transform ourselves. Patterns of consuming, earning, or interacting that may seem unrealistic or even negative before starting down this road become feasible and appealing. Moreover, when big changes are on the table, the narrow trade-offs of the past can be superseded. If we can question consumerism, we're no longer forced to make a mandatory choice between well-being and environment. If we can admit that full-time jobs need not require so many hours, it'll be possible to slow down ecological degradation, address unemployment, and make time for family and community. If we can think about knowledge differently, we can expand social wealth far more rapidly. Stepping outside the "there is no alternative to business-as-usual" thinking that has been a straitjacket for years puts creative options into play. And it opens the doors to double and triple dividends: changes that yield benefits on more than one front. Some of the most important economic research in recent years shows that a single intervention-a community reclamation of a brownfield or planting on degraded agriculture land-can solve three problems. It regenerates an ecosystem, provides income for the restorers, and empowers people as civic actors. In dire straits on the economic and ecological fronts, we have little choice but to find a way forward that addresses both. That’s what plenitude offers.

# 1NR

## Econ

#### Recent empirics go neg

Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, 8/25/’9

(Thomas P.M, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, <http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx>)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape.

None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions.

Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends.

And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.

#### History disproves causality between crisis and war

Ferguson 6 (Niall, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard, a Senior Research Fellow of Jesus College at Oxford, and a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, “The War of the World”, Penguin Books, pg. xxxviii)

Nor can economic crises explain all the violent upheavals of the century. As noted already, perhaps the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography leads from the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of war. Yet on closer inspection this pleasing story falls apart. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression became fascist regimes; nor did all the fascist regimes engage in wars of aggression. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe, but only after its economy had recovered from the Depression. The Soviet Union, which started the war on Hitler’s side, was cut off from the world economic crisis, yet ended up mobilizing and losing more soldiers than any other combatant. For the century as a whole, no general rule is discernible. Some wars came after periods of growth; others were the causes rather than the consequence of economic crisis. And some severe economic crisis did not lead to wars. Certainly, it is now impossible to argue (thought Marxists long tried to) that the First World War was the result of a crisis of capitalism; on the contrary, it abruptly terminated a period of extraordinary global economic integration with relatively high growth and low inflation.

#### Best empirics

Morris Miller, Professor of Administration @ the University of Ottawa, ‘2K

(Interdisciplinary Science Review, v 25 n4 2000 p ingenta connect)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study under- taken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth – bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### Didn’t understand the thesis of the Lipschutz evidence – it’s not a colonialism K - Economic threat predictions relying on global trade and competitiveness are based on paranoia and used to justify elite manipulation of peripheral states in the global economy—that’s Lipschultz—this has resulted in the worst atrocities—Empirics only go negative

Neocleous ‘8

(Mark, Prof. of Government at Brunel, Critique of Security, AM)

In other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former was simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its economic strength – in order to re-order the world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’.99 Despite the fact that ‘econ omic security’ would never be formally deﬁned beyond ‘economic order’ or ‘economic well-being’,100 the signiﬁcant conceptual consistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘**economic well-being’**, economic security seemed to emphasise economic and thus ‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance **helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process** and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and‘social equality’.101 Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bour geoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere . . . It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them . . . to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.102 In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about in part under the guise of security. The whole world became a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of ﬁfteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people **to** **the desire to shape the world** in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of intervention and policing all over the globe. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capital accumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, econ omic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also‘secured’ everywhere. Security politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘intervention’, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an ambitious and frequently **violent strategy**. Here lies the Janus-faced character of American foreign policy.103 One face is the ‘good liberal cop’: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the world’s nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the ‘bad liberal cop’: § Marked 08:42 § should one of these nations decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conﬂict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face; **the ‘liberal moment’ becomes the moment of violence**. This Janus-faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen ﬁt to either overtly or covertly re-order the affairs of myriads of nations – those ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states on the ‘wrong side of history’.104 ‘Extrapolating the ﬁgures as best we can’, one CIA agent commented in 1991,‘there have been about 3,000 major covert operations and over 10,000 minor operations – all illegal, and all designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries’, adding that ‘**every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security’**.105 These would include ‘interventions’ in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the ‘60 or more’ countries identiﬁed as the bases of ‘terror cells’ by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106 The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIA’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was to ‘incapacitate’ foreign ofﬁcials; drug-trafﬁcking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been co-opted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile; indeed, one of the reasons fascism ﬂowed into Latin America was because of the ideology of national security.108 Concomitantly, ‘national security’ has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory ‘security partnerships’ could be established with certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the ﬁve Central Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and China. Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new‘secure’ global liberal order. **The result has been the slaughter of untold numbers.** John Stock well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like this: Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and ﬁguring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difﬁcult. But, adding them up as best we can, we come up with a ﬁgure **of six million people killed** – **and this is a minimum ﬁgure**. Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola – the operation I was part of – and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109 Note that the six million is a minimum ﬁgure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the slaughter bench of history. All of this has been more than conﬁrmed by events in the twentyﬁrst century: in a speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the ofﬁcial National Security Strategy of the United Statesin September of that year, President Bush reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it. While much has been made about the supposedly ‘new’ doctrine of preemption in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine. The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufﬁcient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adver saries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre emptively.110 In other words, **the security policy of the world’s only superpower** in its current ‘war on terror’ **is** still **underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of ‘economic order’.** The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ based on ‘political and economic liberty’, with whole sections devoted to the security beneﬁts of ‘economic liberty’, and the beneﬁts to liberty of the security strategy proposed.111 Economic security (that is, ‘capitalist accumulation’) in the guise of ‘national security’ is now used as the justiﬁcation for all kinds of ‘intervention’, still conducted where necessary in alliance with fascists, gangsters and drug cartels, and the proliferation of ‘national security’ type regimes has been the result. So while the national security state was in one sense a structural bi-product of the US’s place in global capitalism, it was also vital to the fabrication of an international order founded on the power of capital. National security, in effect, became the perfect strategic tool for landscaping the human garden.112 This was to also have huge domestic consequences, as the idea of con tainment would also come to reshape the American social order, helping fabricate a security apparatus intimately bound up with national identity and thus the politics of loyalty.

#### Also turns the entire case

Krugman ‘94,PhD (Paul, Nobel Prize winning Economist, Professor of Economics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, Centenary Professor at the London School of Economics, and an op-ed columnist for The New York Times) March/April Foreign Affairs “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession” l/n

A much more serious risk is that the obsession with competitiveness will lead to trade conflict, perhaps even to a world trade war. Most of those who have preached the doctrine of competitiveness have not been old-fashioned protectionists. They want their countries to win the global trade game, not drop out. But what if, despite its best efforts, a country does not seem to be winning, or lacks confidence that it can? Then the competitive diagnosis inevitably suggests that to close the borders is better than to risk having foreigners take away high-wage jobs and high-value sectors. At the very least, the focus on the supposedly competitive nature of international economic relations greases the rails for those who want confrontational if not frankly protectionist policies. We can already see this process at work, in both the United States and Europe. In the United States, it was remarkable how quickly the sophisticated interventionist arguments advanced by Laura Tyson in her published work gave way to the simple-minded claim by U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor that Japan's bilateral trade surplus was costing the United States millions of jobs. And the trade rhetoric of President Clinton, who stresses the supposed creation of high-wage jobs rather than the gains from specialization, left his administration in a weak position when it tried to argue with the claims of NAFTA foes that competition from cheap Mexican labor will destroy the U.S. manufacturing base.

## China

#### Chinese economy will not collapse – ten unique reasons

**Roach 11** – faculty member at Yale University and Non-Executive Chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia (Stephen S, 5-27, Project Syndicate, “Ten Reasons Why China is Different”, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/roach5/English>)

NEW HAVEN – The China doubters are back in force. They seem to come in waves – every few years, or so. Yet, year in and year out, China has defied the naysayers and stayed the course, perpetuating the most spectacular development miracle of modern times. That seems likely to continue. Today’s feverish hand-wringing reflects a confluence of worries – especially concerns about inflation, excess investment, soaring wages, and bad bank loans. Prominent academics warn that China could fall victim to the dreaded “middle-income trap,” which has derailed many a developing nation. There is a kernel of truth to many of the concerns cited above, especially with respect to the current inflation problem. But they stem largely from misplaced generalizations. Here are ten reasons why it doesn’t pay to diagnose the Chinese economy by drawing inferences from the experiences of others: Strategy. Since 1953, China has framed its macro objectives in the context of five-year plans, with clearly defined targets and policy initiatives designed to hit those targets. The recently enacted 12th Five-Year Plan could well be a strategic turning point – ushering in a shift from the highly successful producer model of the past 30 years to a flourishing consumer society. Commitment. Seared by memories of turmoil, reinforced by the Cultural Revolution of the 1960’s and 1970’s, China’s leadership places the highest priority on stability. Such a commitment served China extremely well in avoiding collater<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/roach5/English>al damage from the crisis of 2008-2009. It stands to play an equally important role in driving the fight against inflation, asset bubbles, and deteriorating loan quality. Wherewithal to deliver. China’s commitment to stability has teeth. More than 30 years of reform have unlocked its economic dynamism. Enterprise and financial-market reforms have been key, and many more reforms are coming. Moreover, China has shown itself to be a good learner from past crises, and shifts course when necessary. Saving. A domestic saving rate in excess of 50% has served China well. It funded the investment imperatives of economic development and boosted the cushion of foreign-exchange reserves that has shielded China from external shocks. China now stands ready to absorb some of that surplus saving to promote a shift toward internal demand. Rural-urban migration. Over the past 30 years, the urban share of the Chinese population has risen from 20% to 46%. According to OECD estimates, another 316 million people should move from the countryside to China’s cities over the next 20 years. Such an unprecedented wave of urbanization provides solid support for infrastructure investment and commercial and residential construction activity. Fears of excess investment and “ghost cities” fixate on the supply side, without giving due weight to burgeoning demand. Low-hanging fruit – Consumption. Private consumption accounts for only about 37% of China’s GDP – the smallest share of any major economy. By focusing on job creation, wage increases, and the social safety net, the 12th Five-Year Plan could spark a major increase in discretionary consumer purchasing power. That could lead to as much as a five-percentage-point increase in China’s consumption share by 2015. Low-hanging fruit – Services. Services account for just 43% of Chinese GDP – well below global norms. Services are an important piece of China’s pro-consumption strategy – especially large-scale transactions-based industries such as distribution (wholesale and retail), domestic transportation, supply-chain logistics, and hospitality and leisure. Over the next five years, the services share of Chinese GDP could rise above the currently targeted four-percentage-point increase. This is a labor-intensive, resource-efficient, environmentally-friendly growth recipe – precisely what China needs in the next phase of its development. Foreign direct investment. Modern China has long been a magnet for global multinational corporations seeking both efficiency and a toehold in the world’s most populous market. Such investments provide China with access to modern technologies and management systems – a catalyst to economic development. China’s upcoming pro-consumption rebalancing implies a potential shift in FDI – away from manufacturing toward services – that could propel growth further. Education. China has taken enormous strides in building human capital. The adult literacy rate is now almost 95%, and secondary school enrollment rates are up to 80%. Shanghai’s 15-year-old students were recently ranked first globally in math and reading as per the standardized PISA metric. Chinese universities now graduate more than 1.5 million engineers and scientists annually. The country is well on its way to a knowledge-based economy. Innovation. In 2009, about 280,000 domestic patent applications were filed in China, placing it third globally, behind Japan and the United States. China is fourth and rising in terms of international patent applications. At the same time, China is targeting a research-and-development share of GDP of 2.2% by 2015 – double the ratio in 2002. This fits with the 12th Five-Year Plan’s new focus on innovation-based “strategic emerging industries” – energy conservation, new-generation information technology, biotechnology, high-end equipment manufacturing, renewable energy, alternative materials, and autos running on alternative fuels. Currently, these seven industries account for 3% of Chinese GDP; the government is targeting a 15% share by 2020, a significant move up the value chain. Yale historian Jonathan Spence has long cautioned that the West tends to view China through the same lens as it sees itself. Today’s cottage industry of China doubters is a case in point. Yes, by our standards, China’s imbalances are unstable and unsustainable. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao has, in fact, gone public with a similar critique. But that’s why China is so different. It actually takes these concerns seriously. Unlike the West, where the very concept of strategy has become an oxymoron, China has embraced a transitional framework aimed at resolving its sustainability constraints. Moreover, unlike the West, which is trapped in a dysfunctional political quagmire, China has both the commitment and the wherewithal to deliver on that strategy. This is not a time to bet against China.

#### Any risk of a link turns the case—causes violent geo-political enframing of China that causes actual conflict—we control global uniqueness.

Lim ’11

(Kean Fan, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, “What You See Is (Not) What You Get? The Taiwan Question, Geo-economic Realities, and the “China Threat” Imaginary,” Antipode Journal, Wiley Online Library, AM)

We live in a world replete with a motley set of security threats: some that we encounter locally on a daily basis, some more geographically removed, some purely imaginary. The situation becomes more convoluted when it comes to assessing “national” security threats, because threat identification presupposes the “nation”, as a collective group of disparate citizens, would somehow be affected by such threats. This is not easy, because addressing one “national” threat (eg state-to-state military threat) may not correspond to the needs for other forms of security (eg access to healthcare services, gainful employment etc). Erroneous threat imaginations could generate a **self-fulfilling prophecy**—the supposed “threats which never were” might actually turn real. The challenge for accurate threat identifications grows even harder when variegated doses of capitalist realism permeate foreign policymaking and lead to the creation of transnational geo-economic configurations involving putative geopolitical rivals. In this paper, I have illustrated how geopolitical calculations remain significant and might be incommensurable with geo-economic conceptions of security that view integrated, cross-border spaces of/for capital accumulation as a primary precondition of political and social stability. From China’s foreign policies over the past decade, it is evident that **Chinese leaders prefer carving open space for economic development to armed conflicts**. The development of East Asia into a dynamic and fast-growing region within the global system of capitalism is significantly contingent on the Chinese government’s peace-oriented foreign and trade policies towards neighboring countries. Since its politico-economic liberalization in 1979, China—a distinct Cold War “enemy”, together with the nowdefunct Soviet Union—has demonstrated no ideological or military hostility towards its regional neighbors and the US for the past three decades; tout au contraire, relations between these nation-states have strengthened after the Cold War. More significantly, China’s stance towards North Korea’s military provocations—notably its alleged sinking of a South Korean warship and shelling of a South Korean island in March and November 2010 respectively—have mutated from overt acceptance to tacit tolerance, which reflects its importance as a strategic partner in preventing violence (especially nuclear warfare) on the Korean peninsula. The emergence of new geo-economic formations further complicates the picture: both the US and Taiwan are involved in geo-economic configurations with China, and all three economies are experimenting with different forms of regulatory structures that frees up economic space for flows of capital, commodities and people. This corresponds with Cowen and Smith’s (2009:43) observation that “[t]he rise of geoeconomics does not necessarily mean that boundaries and territories become less important, but their strict national articulation may”. On this evidence, it might be difficult to pinpoint China as a direct “national” threat to the US **or any other nation-state**. I emphasized in the discussion that any assessment of a “threat” from China as a result of its geopolitical standoff with Taiwan needs to be **critically interpreted** because the US—through an ambiguous geo-legal definition of Taiwan—**contributes significantly to the production of this “threat”.** Furthermore, fears within the US of China’s ascendency in the global system of capitalism could be concatenated—either explicitly or subconsciously—to a corresponding fear of the loss of global economic competitiveness by the US. After all, as Harvey (2003:12) reminds us, “[t]here is indeed a long history of governments in trouble domestically seeking to solve their problems either by foreign adventures or by manufacturing foreign threats to consolidate solidarities at home”. But is it necessary to think of US economic relations with China in such zero-sum terms?

## Terror

#### Low threshold – even if a few terrorists don’t want WMDs, that causes the operation to fall apart

Stern, fellow – CFR, ‘99

(Jessica, Suvival 40:4, p. 177 – 178, Winter)

Falkenrath describes the obstacles that terrorists would have to overcome before they could use NBC weapons to create mass casualties. A specific threat of NBC terrorism arises, Falkenrath writes, when a group falls into three categories simultaneously: it must be capable of acquiring and using NBC weapons; it must be interested in mass murder; and it must want to use NBC weapons to achieve it. But analysis of groups that have attempted to cause mass casualties (not necessarily with NBC weapons) shows that the obstacles to such attacks are not only technical, but also organizational.5 Terrorist groups are not monolithic. Even if most members of a group are committed to an attack, a single defector can mean the difference between success and failure. For example, in April 1997, the FBI prevented four members of a Texas-based chapter of the Ku Klux Klan from blowing up a natural-gas refinery. The chapter’s leader had misgivings about the plot and informed the FBI about his colleagues’ plans.6 Operatives can be struck with moral scruples at the critical moment, even if they were committed to carrying out an attack in advance. For example, an *Aum Shinrikyo* member reportedly did not arm a biological weapon because he suddenly felt that attacking innocent people was wrong.7 Operatives (including former members aware of plots) sometimes turn their colleagues over to the authorities in return for a promise of clemency. The ‘Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord’, and American neo-Nazi group active in the mid-1980s, plotted to poison municipal water supplies in major US cities. But a number of participants, in exchange for leniency, became FBI informants after their arrest on unrelated charges.8 Groups capable of carrying out mass-casualty attacks would have to be unusually organized, disciplined and ruthless to avoid being penetrated by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. *Ad hoc* groups that come together to carry out a specific attack or a series of attacks are more likely to meet these organizational requirements than traditional terrorist organizations. A number of Middle Eastern groups are structured along these lines, as are some American anti-government ones. Governments should focus their efforts on learning how to penetrate such groups.

#### Al-Qaeda lies about wanting WMD’s to scare the U.S.

Dolnik 3, Adam Center for Nonproliferation Studies, (Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 26.1)

Groups Motivated Predominantly by Islamist Ideology (al Qaida, PIJ). Groups in this category are even less discriminatory in their suicide bombings than those of the preceding category. But despite the religious justifications that allow them to dehumanize civilians more effectively, the CBRN involvement of these groups remains on the level of declared interest. And even though many open-source reports and court testimonies document Al Qaida’s attempts to acquire CBRN agents, no hard evidenceof Al Qaida’s CBRN capabilities exists.91 Further, the fact that Al Qaida’s attempted acquisition of CBRN is public knowledge suggests that not much effort was invested into concealing this information; quite the contrary. Under Lesson 9 subsection d) of the Al Qaida training manual, the group’s members are instructed exactly on what to say when captured and interrogated. 92 It is quite possible that the existing claims of CBRN activities by the group’s members are part of a deliberate misinformation campaigndesigned to spread fear and to divert the U.S. government’s attention from other forms of attack. In terms of agent selection, it is interesting to note that these groups tend to claim possession of all types of CBRN weapons.

#### Your terror discourse enables mass state violence

Jackson 9 (Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p.77-80)

In contrast to first order critique, second order critique involves the adoption of a critical standpoint outside of the discourse. That is, based on an understanding of discourse as socially productive or constitutive and fully cognisant of the know­ledge-power nexus, a second order critique attempts to expose the political func­tions and ideological consequences of the particular narratives, practices, and forms of representation enunciated within the dominant terrorism studies discourse. In the first place, it can be argued that terrorism studies fulfills an obvious ideological function because, as Jeroen Gunning (2007a) has convincingly shown, the dominant knowledge' of the field is an ideal type of "problem-solving theory'. According to Robert Cox, ‘problem-solving theory takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action’, and then works to "make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble' (Cox. 1981: 128 129). In this instance, problem-solving theories of terrorism do not question the extent to which the status quo and the dominant actors within it, the hierarchies and operation of power and the inequalities and injustices thus generated could be impli­cated in the very 'problem' of terrorism itself or the many other forms of violence which it is inextricably bound up with. The problem-solving character of the field is illustrated most prosaically by the ubiquitous efforts of virtually every terrorism studies scholar to provide research that is 'policy relevant' and which will assist the state in its efforts to defeat terrorism, and by the widespread tendency to uncritically accept the state's categorisations, definitions, dichotomies, and demonisations (see Toms and Gunning, this volume). Andrew Silke's study concluded that a great deal of the field's output is driven by policy concerns and is limited to address­ing government agendas (Silke. 2004d: 58). This characteristic is not at all surprising given that terrorism studies' origins lie in counter-insurgency studies, security studies, and neo-realist approaches to international relations at the height of the cold war (Burnett and Whyte. 2005: 11-13). In fact, the first major review of the field concluded that much of its early output appeared to be 'counterinsurgency masquerading as political science\* (Schinid and Jongman, 1988: 182). More recently, the events of 11 September 2001 galvanised a whole new generation of scholars who were understandably eager to offer their skills in the cause of preventing further such attacks and "solving” the terrorism 'problem’. They therefore had little reason to question the dominant orientation of the field towards assisting state security or the underlying assumptions this necessarily entails. The desire to assist governments in their efforts to control the destructive effects of non-state terrorism is not necessarily problematic in and of itself; nor does it imply any bad faith on the part of individual scholars (Morgan and Boyle. 2008). In fact, the prevention of violence against civilians is a highly laudable aspiration. However, when virtually the entire academic field collectively adopts state priorities and aims, and when it tailors its research towards assisting state agencies in fighting terrorism (as defined by state institutions), it means that terrorism studies functions ideologically as an intellectual arm of the state and is aligned with its broader hegemonic project. The field's problem-solving, state-oriented and therefore ideological character is also illustrated by the way in which the field's 'knowledge' functions to delegitimise any kind of non-state violence while simultaneously reifying and legit­imising the state's employment of violence; and the way it constructs terrorism as a social problem to be solved by the state but never as a problem of state violence itself. From this viewpoint, the silence regarding state terrorism within the dis­course (Jackson. 2008b). and in particular the argument of many terrorism studies scholars that state actions should not be defined as 'terrorism', actually functions to furnish states with an authoritative academic justification for using what may actually be terroristic forms of violence against their opponents and citizens. In effect, it provides them with greater leeway when applying terror-based forms of violence against civilians, a leeway exploited by a great many states who intimi­date groups and individuals with the application of massive and disproportionate state violence. In other words, by occluding and obscuring the very possibility of state terrorism, and as a field with academic and political authority, the discourse of terrorism studies can be considered part of the conditions that actually make state terrorism possible. Furthermore, the discourse is deeply ideological in the way in which its core assumptions, narratives, and knowledge-producing practices function to legit­imise existing power structures and particular hegemonic political practices in society. For instance, the primary' focus on the 'problem' of non-state terrorism functions to distract from and deny the long history of Western involvement in terrorism (sec Blakeley. forthcoming), thereby constructing Western foreign policy as essentially benign - rather than aimed primarily at reifying existing structures of power and domination in the international system, for example. That is, by deflecting criticism of particular Western policies, the discourse works to maintain the potentially dangerous myth the accepted common sense among Western scholars and Western publics - of Western exceptionalism. This sense of exceptionalism in turn permits Western states and their allies to pursue a range of discrete and often illiberal political projects and partisan interests aimed at maintaining dominance in a hegemonic liberal international order. Specifically, by reinforcing the dominant 'knowledge’ that non-state terrorism is a much greater security threat than state terrorism and by obscuring the ways in which counterterrorism itself can morph into state terrorism (see Jackson, forthcoming), the discourse functions to legitimise the current global war on terror and its associated policies of military intervention and regime change, extraordinary rendition, military expansion to new regions, military assistance programmes (often to repressive regimes), the imposition of sanctions, the isolation of oppositional political movements, and the like (see, among many others, Stokes and Raphael, forthcoming; F.I Fadl. 2002; Mahajan. 2002, 2003; C'allinicos. 2003). More directly, the discourse provides legitimacy to broader counter-insurgency or counterterrorism programmes in strategic regions where the actual underlying aims clearly reside in the maintenance of a particular political-economic order such as is occurring in Colombia at the present time (see Stokes, 2006). At the domestic level, the dominant terrorism discourse can and has been used by political elites to justify and promote a whole range of political projects, such as: expanding and strengthening the institutions of national security and the military-industrial complex; the construction of extensive surveillance and social control systems; the normalisation of security procedures across all areas of social life; expanding the powers and jurisdiction of state security agencies and the executive branch, in large part by normalising a state of exception; controlling wider social and political dissent, restricting human rights, and setting the parameters for accept­able public debate; and altering (he legal system - among others (see. among manyothers. Mueller. 2006; Lustick. 2006; Cole, 2007. 2003; Jackson. 2007c; Scratou. 2002). Lastly, we must note that powerful economic interests particularly those linked to the security sector, such as private security firms, defence industries, and pharmaceutical companies, among others all benefit materially and politic­ally from the primary narratives of the terrorism studies discourse. For example, the accepted "knowledge' that non-state terrorism poses a catastrophic threat to Western society has in part resulted in contracts worth many millions of dollars to private security companies for site security at airports and government build­ings, while pharmaceutical companies have been contracted to provide millions of vaccines and decontamination material in case of bioterrorism (see Mueller, 2006). In other words, there are a clear set of identifiable political-economic and elite interests that are served by the discourse. In sum, it seems clear that the discourse functions to encourage the reification and extension of state hegemony both internationally and domestically, and directly serves a range of political and economic interests. Perhaps more import­antly, the discourse reinforces the widely accepted belief in the instrumental rationality of violence as an effective tool of politics (Burke. 2008), particularly as it relates to counterterrorism. As such, it can be argued that the discourse and knowledge practices of terrorism studies function as a kind of disciplinary and hegemonic truth regime designed to reify existing structures of power and domi­nance. Despite the intentions of individual terrorism scholars therefore, who may believe that they are engaged in objective academic analysis of a clearly defined phenomenon, the broader discourse which they reproduce and legitimise actually serves distinctly political purposes and has clear ideological consequences for society.